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effect of the draft Revised Code on existing law and also provides a section-by-section analysis of each 
provision of the draft Revised Code. Appendices include derivations of each provision of the Code; existing 
law that the Code will revise; and an index to commentary. 
Additional information 
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order to be convicted of a crime) and the lack of a coherent, rational sentencing structure. 
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INTRODUCTION TO TENTATIVE DRAFT, PART 2 
Tentative Draft, Part 2 ,  is comprised of seven 
articles of the Revised Criminal Code - general principles 
of criminal liability, parties to crime, justification, 
attempt and related offenses, robbery, bribery and related 
offenses and perjury and related offenses. 
Tentative Draft, Part 1, was distributed in early 
February and was comprised of four articles contained in 
the Offenses Against the Person chapter of the Revised 
Criminal Code - criminal homicide, assault and related 
offenses, kidnapping and related offenses and sexual offenses. 
Tentative Draft, Part 3, will be distributed in 
mid-March and will include articles on theft, burglary, 
arson and forgery. 
Commentary follows each article in the Tentative 
Draft and is designed to aid the reader in analyzing the 
effect of the Revised Code on existing law. The Commentary 
also provides a section-by-section analysis of each provision 
of the Revised Code. All references in the Commentary to 
Tentative Draft provisions contain the letters TD before the 
usual AS cite. 
Each Tentative Draft also contains several 
appendixes that will be useful in analyzing the Revised Code. 
Appendix I lists the derivations of all sections 
in the Revised Code. 
1 . 
Appendix II allows the reader to compare 
provisions of the Revised Code with existing law. 
Finally, Apendix III is comprised of an index 
which can be used in locating the page of Commentary in 
which a provision of the Revised Code is discussed. 
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CHAPTER 11. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
SECTION 
100 
llO 
120 
130 
140 
General Requirements of Culpability 
Construction of Statutes with respect to Culpability 
Effect of Ignorance or Mistake 
Intoxication or Drug Abuse as Defense 
Definitions 
Sec. 11.11.100. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF CULPABILITY. (a) The 
minimal requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a 
person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to per­
form an act which he is capable of performing. 
(b) A person is not guilty of an offense unless he acts with a
culpable mental state with respect to each element of the offense that 
necessarily requires a culpable mental state, except that 
(1) no culpable mental state must be proved with respect to
any element of an offense if the description of the offense does not 
specify a culpable mental state and the offense is 
(A) a violation;
(B) designated as one of "strict liability";
(2) no culpable mental state must be proved with respect to a
particular element of the offense if an intent to dispense with the 
culpable mental state requirement for that element clearly appears. 
Sec. 11.11.110. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES WITH RESPECT TO CULPA­
BILITY. (a) When the commission of an offense, or some element of an 
offense, requires a particular culpable mental state, the mental state 
is ordinarily designated in the statute defining the offense by use of 
the terms "intentionally", "knowingly", "recklessly" or "criminal 
negligence", or by use of terms such as "with intent to defraud" and 
"knowing it to be false", describing a specific kind of intent or know-
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ledge. When only one such term appears in a statute defining an of­
fense, it is presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless an 
intent to limit its application clearly appears. 
(b) Except as provided in sec. lOO(b) of this chapter, if a 
statute defining an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, 
culpability is nonetheless required and is established only if a person 
acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly. 
(c) When a statute provides that criminal negligence suffices to 
establish an element of an offense, that element is also established if 
a person acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly. If acting reck­
lessly suffices to establish an element, that element also is estab­
lished if a person acts intentionally or knowingly. If acting knowingly 
suffices to establish an element, that element is also established if a 
person acts intentionally. 
Sec. 11.11.120. EFFECT OF IGNORANCE OR MISTAKE UPON LIABILITY. 
(a) Knowledge that conduct constitutes an offense, or knowledge of the 
existence, meaning or application of the statute defining an offense, is 
not an element of an offense unless the statute clearly so provides. 
(b) A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct 
because he engages in the conduct under a mistaken belief of fact, 
unless 
(1) the factual mistake negates the culpable mental state 
required for the commission of an offense; 
(2) the statute defining the offense or a related statute 
exyressly provides that the factual mistake constitutes a defense or 
exemption; or 
(3) the factual mistake is of a kind that supports a defense 
of justification as provided in ch. 21 of this title. 
Sec. 11.11.130. INTOXICATION OR DRUG USE AS DEFENSE. (a) Volun-
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tary intoxication or drug use does not, as such, constitute a defense to 
a criminal charge, but in a prosecution for an offense, evidence that 
the defendant used drugs or was intoxicated may be offered whenever it 
is relevant to negate an element of the crime that requires a culpable 
mental state. 
(b) When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if 
the defendant, due to voluntary intoxication or drug use, is unaware of 
a risk of which he would have been aware had he not been intoxicated or 
not using drugs, that unawareness is immaterial. 
Sec. 11.11.140. DEFINITIONS. (a) For purposes of this title, 
unless the context otherwise requires, 
(1) a person acts "intentionally" with respect to a result or 
to conduct described by a provision of law defining an offense when his 
conscious objective is to cause that result or to engage in the conduct; 
(2) a person acts "knowingly" with respect to conduct or to a 
circumstance described by a provision of law defining an offense when he 
is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that the circumstance 
exists; when knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an 
element of an offense, that knowledge is established if a person is 
aware of a substantial probability of its existence, unless he actually 
believes it does not exist; 
(3) a person acts "recklessly" with respect to a result or to 
a circumstance described by a provision of law defining an offense when 
he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjusti­
fiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists; 
the risk must be of such a nature and degree that disregard of it con­
stitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reason­
able person would observe in the situation; a person who is unaware of a 
risk of which he would have been aware had he not been intoxicated or 
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using drugs acts recklessly with respect to that risk; 
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(4) a person acts "with criminal negligence" with respect to 
a result or to a circumstance described by a provision of law defining 
an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists; the 
risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it 
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reason­
able person would observe in the situation. 
(b) In this title, 
(1) "act" means a bodily movement; 
(2) "conduct" means an act or omission and its accompanying 
mental state; 
(3) "culpable mental state" means "intentionally, " "knowing­
ly, " "recklessly," or with "criminal negligence" as those terms are 
defined in (a) of this section; 
(4) "omission" means a failure to perform an act for which a 
duty of performance is imposed by law; 
(5) "to act" means either to perform an act or to omit to 
perform an act; 
(6) "voluntary act" means a bodily movement performed con­
sciously as a result of effort and determination, and includes the 
possession of property if the actor was aware of his physical possession 
or control for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate it. 
6. 
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 11. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
COMMENTARY 
The Effect of the Revised Code Provisions on the Existing 
Law of General Principles of Criminal Liability 
In defining the four culpable mental states used 
throughout the Revised Code and in providing specific rules 
of construction, the General Principles of Criminal Liability 
Chapter: 
1. Eliminates the unnecessary ambiguity in the current 
description of offenses caused by the haphazard 
approach of existing law to the critically impor­
tant concept of mens rea. 
2. Provides that at least one of the four culpable 
mental states will be applicable to each offense in 
the Revised Code, whether by an explicit listing or 
through a rule of construction. Currently, at least. 
twenty undefined terms are used without any consistency 
in the existing statutes. The use of the four culpable 
mental states throughout the Revised Code will promote 
clarity and uniformity in the giving of jury instruc­
tions and in the interpretation of individual sections. 
3. Creates a structure for the classification of 
offenses according to degrees of blameworthiness. 
The culpable mental states of intentional, knowing, 
reckless and criminal negligence provide a four­
tiered framework of culpable mental states which 
clearly establishes levels of blameworthiness. 
7. 
INTRODUCTION. USE OF MENS REA TERMS IN CURRENT ALASKA STATUTES. 
One of the primary goals of the Revised Code is the 
elimination of unnecessary ambiguity in the current descriptions 
of many offenses. A primary source of that ambiguity lies in 
the current law's rather haphazard approach to the definition 
of mens rea -- the culpable mental state with which a defendant 
must perform an act before he can be convicted of a crime. As 
an example of mens rea, under existing law a defendant is guilty 
of first degree arson only if he starts a fire "wilfully and 
maliciously. " 
The area of culpable mental states is of critical 
importance in the criminal law as the Alaska Supreme Court has 
held that, except for a limited number of crimes, a defendant 
may not be convicted under a statute that fails to require that 
he act with a culpable mental state. See, Speidel v. State, 
460 P.2d 77 (AK 1969) and State v. Campbell, 536 P. 2d 105 
(AK 1975). 
Despite the importance of �ens rea in the criminal 
law, many existing statutes make no mention of this factor.l/ 
!/ For example, existing AS 33.30.055 makes it a crime for a 
person to introduce, or take or send from a state prison or state 
correctional facility, a contraband article enumerated in a rule 
or regulation promulgated by the Commissioner of Health and 
Social Services. No mention is made as to whether the actor 
must intend to introduce or take away the contraband article or 
even know whether it is included within the class of articles 
determined to be "contraband" by the Commissioner. Other 
provisions refer to the mental element at one point and not at 
another. For example, AS 11.30. 250 prohibits an officer in 
custody from "wilfully" destroying, mutilating, defacing, 
secreting, falsifying, etc. , a public document in the officer's 
custody but later merely refers to an officer who "permits" 
another to do so. 
8 
In some cases such omissions are designed to create strict 
liability offenses, but in many others, it may be a product 
of oversight. The difficulty is that one cannot always be 
sure in which category a specific provision should fall. 
Consider, for example, the current statute making 
it a misdemeanor for a person to misuse, damage or destroy 
a " camp'' not his own which is capable of use for protection 
of life or property. �/ It is possible that this law is 
aimed at those persons who realize or should reasonably 
realize that the "camp" is capable of use for protection of 
life or property and is an "improved site". On the other 
hand, the absence of any reference to a requisite mental 
element may indicate a legislative intent to impose a strict 
duty to preserve any ''improved site" regardless of knowledge 
that it in fact is an "improved site." Similar provisions 
in other areas often specify that the person act "wilfully or 
maliciously", "maliciously or wantonly", or simply "wilfully" 
in their abuse of another's property. ii Yet others do not -­
whether by reason or inadvertence again is unclear. 
The absence of any reference to mens rea creates 
problems of interpretation even when the statute involved 
is clearly not intended to impose strict liability. Consider, 
for example, a provision prohibiting the aiding or assisting 
2/ 
See, AS 11.20.670 and AS 11. 20.690 (the latter defines 
"camp" as improved site intended for habitation or use 
during any part of the year). 
See, AS 11. 20.520; 11.20.525; 11.20. 590; 11. 20. 610. 
9 • 
of a prisoner's escape or attempt to escape by "any means. "-�_/ 
The basic nature of this offense indicates that some culpable 
mental state is required, but at exactly what level is uncertain. 
Must the actor intend to rescue, aid or assist the prisoner or is 
reckless disregard of the risk that his conduct will aid an 
escape sufficient? Must he have knowledge that the person he is 
aiding is in fact a prisoner or is recklessness in this regard 
sufficient also? Of course, analogous statutes or common logic 
may provide satisfactory answers�/ but the legislature's oversight 
in failing to specify the requisite mens rea leaves the issue 
sufficiently open to foster ne0dless litigation. 
Unfortunately, the difficulties involved in defining 
mens rea have hardly been reduced by most legislative attempts 
to specifically describe the required mental element. The 
terms most frequently used in the current statutes to describe 
mens rea are "wilfully, " "knowingly, " "intentionally" (or 
"with intent to. . . ") and "maliciously. ,,§__/ Apparently, none 
has a "set" definition. Ivhat each term requires seems to 
See, AS 11. 30. 080. 
5
/ See, AS 11. 30. 120; 11. 30.150; 11. 30. 170; 11. 30. 080. 
(Thesestatutes deal with escape wherein the third 
party individual or official need act "voluntarily or through 
negligence", "with intent to effect or aid the escape, " or 
"wilfully and wrongfully" in assisting or causing an escape. ) 
61 See the various provisions in the following chapters of the 
current Alaska Criminal Code: Chap. 20 (malicious mischief and 
trespass) ; Chap. 40 (crimes against public morality and decency) ; 
Chap. 25 (forgery and counterfeiting) . 
10. 
depend primarily on the specific statutory context in which 
it arises, with very few guidelines for separating one context 
from another. 
The use of mens rea terms is even more confusing 
where the terms have been used in combination. Closely related 
provisions in existing law will use the terms conjunctively 
and sometimes alternatively without suggesting any rational 
patterns for the variation. For example, statutes prohibiting 
the falsification or destruction of corporate or company 
records require wilful �nd knowing conduct. Another similar 
statute prohibiting the making or altering of receipts in a 
warehouse (similar to the above example in that both involve 
tampering with business documents) punishes those acts only 
when they are done wilfully or knowingly.2/ 
Legislative efforts to describe the requisite culpable 
mental state in crimes relating to the breaking or destroying 
of property provide a vivid illustration of the confusion 
surrounding mens rea usage in Alaska's criminal statutes. For 
example, cemeteries, public highways and facilities may not be 
destroyed or injured "wilfully"; a tenant may not destroy his 
landlord's property "maliciously or wantonly", while an arsonist 
may not act "wilfully and maliciously"_..§./ 
7/ See, AS 11. 20. 4 30; 11. 20.440 and 11. 25.070. 
..§_/ See, AS 11. 20. 590; 11.40. 460 and 11. 20. 010. 
11. 
SECTION ANALYSIS OF REVISED CODE 
I. TD AS 11. 11.140. DEFINITIONS. 
Subsections (b) (1)- (6) define terms which are used 
primarily in TD AS 11. 11. 100. 
movement. 
In subsection (1) , " act" is defined as a bodily 
Subsection (6) defines "voluntary act" as a bodily 
movement done consciously as a result of effort and determination. 
Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knew he had 
physical control for a sufficient period of time to have been 
able to terminate his possession. Subsections (2), (4) and (5) 
stress that omissions to act are included in the concept of 
conduct, but they must involve a failure to perform a duty 
required by law. 
Subsection (3) lists the four culpable mental states 
which apply throughout the Revised Code. 
Subsections (a) (1)- (4) change Alaska law concerning 
what constitutes mens rea by defining precisely the kinds of 
culpable mental states that may be made elements of criminal 
offenses. Whether the four terms change the mens rea content of 
a particular crime from existing law can only be determined by 
looking at the particular section of the Revised Code to see 
what term is used, and by comparing that section with the 
existing statute and case law. 
The confusion attending this area can best be illus­
trated by a partial ljst of the wide variety of culpable mental 
states now found within the existing criminal statutes: 
12. 
1. Knowingly - used in 18 statutes 
2. Wilfully - used in 24 statutes 
Wilfully and knowingly - used in 8 statutes --3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Wilfully or knowingly - used in 1 statute 
Wilfully or negligently - used in 1 statute 
Wilfully and maliciously - used in 8 statutes 
7. Wilfully and deliberately - used in 1 statute 
8. Maliciously - used in 4 statutes 
9. Maliciously or wantonly - used in 2 statutes 
10. Purposely and deliberately - used in 1 statute 
11. Purposely and maliciously - used in 1 statute 
12. Purposely - used in l statute 
13. Knowingly or recklessly used in 1 statute 
14. Intentionally - used in 4 statutes 
15. Surreptitiously - used in l statute 
16. Negligently or recklessly - used in 1 statute 
1 7. Wilfully and lewdly - used in 1 statute 
18. Wilfully and wrongfully - used in 2 statutes 
19. Corruptly - used in 3 statutes 
20. Unlawfully - used in 2 statutes 
The present proliferation of culpable mental states in 
existing law frustrates one of the principal p-urposes of the 
mens rea concept, that of providing a structure for the classifica­
tion of offenses according to their degree of blameworthiness. 
The Revised Code solves this problem by providing a four-tiered 
framework of culpable mental states which clearly establishes 
levels of blameworthiness. 
13. 
The culpable mental states defined in subsections (a) (1)­
(4) apply throughout the Revised Code. The exclusive use of 
these terms promotes clarity and uniformity in giving jury 
instructions and in interpreting the meaning of individual 
sections. 
As an aid to analysis, the Revised Code follows the 
practice of other criminal code revisions in distinguishing 
three separate types of elements of offenses to which the 
culpable mental states apply: 
1. the nature of the conduct; and 
2. the circumstances surrounding the conduct; and 
3. the result of the conduct. 
The first type of element, conduct, involves the 
nature of the proscribed act or the manner in which the defendant 
acts. Unlawful imprisonment, for example, involves the restraint 
of another. The conduct involved is the restraint. Intention-
ally and knowingly are the two culpable mental states associated 
with conduct. 
The second type of element, the circumstances surround­
ing the conduct, refers to a situation having a bearing on the 
actor's culpability. Unlawful imprisonment requires that the 
restraint be without the victim's consent. The lack of consent 
is an example of a circumstance surrounding the actor's conduct, 
and is an element of the crime. Knowingly, recklessly and 
criminally negligent are the culpable mental states associrt�P.<l 
with circumstances. 
14. 
The third tyµ8 of element is the result of the actor's 
conduct. Unlawful imprisonment may be aggravated if the actor 
exposes the victim to a risk of serious physical injury. The 
result of the actor's conduct therefore involves an alteration 
in the status of the victim. Intentionally, recklessly and 
criminally negligent are the culpable mental states associated 
with results. 
TD AS 11. 11. 140 (rt) (1) and. '.a) (2) Intentionally and Knowinqly 
When a statute in the Revised Code provides that a 
defendant must ''intentionally" engage in conduct or cause a 
result, the state must prove that it was the defendant's "conscious 
objective to cause that result or to engage in that conduct. " 
Second Degree Assault, for example, requires that the defendant 
"intentionally" cause the result of physical injury. 
TD AS ll. 41. 210 (a) (2). The state therefore must prove that it 
was the conscious objective of the defendant to cause physical 
injury. Indecent Exposure, however, requires that the defendant 
"intentionally" engage in the conduct of "exposing" the specified 
parts of his body. TD AS 11.41. 450. In such a case the prose-
cution must prove that it was the defendant's conscious 
objective to expose certain parts of his body. 
Knowledge, on the other hand, requires an awareness on 
the part of the defendant that his conduct is of the nature 
described by the statute defining the offense or that the 
circumstances described by the statute exist. For example, 
15. 
unlawful imprisonment occurs when the defendant knowingly 
"restrains" another. TD AS 1 1. 4 1. 1  70, 11 . 11. 110 (b) . The 
prosecution must therefore prove that the defendant restrained 
the victim being aware that his conduct was restraining the victim. 
It would be irrelevant that the defendant's conscious objective 
was to restrain his daughter who happened to be in the same 
room. 
The Revised Code covers the situation where a 
person deliberately avoids acquiring knowledge by closing his 
eyes (sometimes known as "wilful blindness") within the def­
inition of "knowing" by providing that "when knowledge of 
the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, 
that knowledge is established if a person is aware of a sub­
stantial probability of its existence, unless he actually 
believes it does not exist. " This formulation is based on 
a current jury instruction of "knowing" which in part provides 
that "no person can intentionally avoid knowled9e by closing 
his eyes to facts which should promote him to investigate. " 
State v. Elliot #76-4 218 (Superior Court, 3d Jud. Dist. , 1976) . 
The great majority of statutes in the Revised 
Code use "knowingly" as the culpable mental state with 
respect to conduct. However, if a statute requires that 
the defendant act "knowingly'', the state may nevertheless 
prove its case by establishing that the conduct was engaged in 
"intentionally" by virtue of the rule of construction set forth 
16. 
in TD AS 11. 11. llO (c) . Furthermore, if no mental state appears 
in the statute, the conduct must be engaged in "knowingly" by 
virtue of the rule of construction in TD AS 11.11. llO(b) . 
"Intentionally" does not serve as a culpable mental 
state for an element of an offense which is a circumstance 
surrounding conduct. Under the Revised Code, a person does 
not "intend" circumstances; he "knows" of their existence. 
"Knowingly" may not serve as a culpable mental 
state for an element of an offense which is a result; a person 
"intends" a result. Although one can "know" that a result is 
practically certain to occur, "intentionally" more properly 
connotes the active purposeful state of mind with which a 
result is achieved. 
In summary, an actor "intends" a result; he "knows" 
that a circumstance exists. Conduct can be performed either 
"knowingly" or "intentionally" but is virtually always required to 
be "knowing" under the Revised Code. 
TD AS 11. 15. 140 (3) and (4) Recklessness and Criminal Negligence 
The common denominators of the terms "recklessness" 
and "criminal negligence" are that the underlying conduct must, 
in each instance, involve (1) "a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk" that some result will occur or that circumstances exist, 
and (2) disregard of that risk constituting a "gross deviation" 
from a normal standard of care, but not the "mere inadvertence 
or simple neglect" criticized as a basis for liability in 
17. 
Alex v. State, 484 P. 2d 677, 681 (AK 1971) and Stork v. State, 
Sup. Ct. Op. No. 1365 (File No. 2708) (1977) . 
The reckless offender is aware of that risk and 
"consciously disregards" it. However, a person who is unaware of 
a risk because of voluntary intoxication or voluntary drug use 
also acts recklessly with respect to the risk. See also, 
discussion of TD AS ll.ll. 130 (b), § V, infra. The criminally 
negligent offender, on the other hand, is not aware of the risk 
created and, hence, disregards it unconsciously. His liability 
stems from a culpable failure to perceive the risk. His 
culpability, though less than that of the reckless offender, 
is appreciably greater than that required for ordinary civil 
negligence by virtue of the "substantial and unjustifiable" 
character of the risk involved and the factor of "gross deviation" 
from the ordinary standard of care. 
There is little discussion in Alaska case law of the 
standards of recklessness and criminal negligence, though 
AS 28. 35.040 and . 045 recognize the crimes of Reckless and 
Negligent Driving. In De Sacia v. State, 469 P.2d 369, 371 
(AK 1970) , a case involving a prosecution for manslaughter, the 
Supreme Court quoted with approval the following jury instruc­
tions on " culpable negligence": 
In Ins. No. 12, the court cautioned the 
jury that culpable negligence must be 
die�inguished from ordinary negligence, 
and that in order to convict, the jury 
" must find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant's acts constituted 
culpable negligence, not ordinary negli-
gence. '' Finally, in Ins. No. 16, the 
court went to considerable length in 
defining culpable negligence: 
18. 
Culpable negligence is something 
more than that slight degree of neg­
ligence necessary to support a civil 
action for damages, and is negligence 
of such a degree, so gross and wanton, 
as to be deserving of punishment. 
Culpable negligence implies a reckless 
disregard of the consequences which 
might ensue from the doing of an act 
and constitutes conduct of such a reck­
less, gross and wanton character as to 
indicate an utter, heedless indiffer­
ence to the rights, property, safety 
and even the lives of others. 
The Revised Code's definitions of "criminal negli­
gence" and "recklessness" are consistent with the "culpable 
negligence" instruction considered in De __ _§aci�, su_pE_�, in 
that all three require that the defendant's culpability be 
greater than mere civil negligence. However, the Revised Code 
follows the lead of all recent revisions by scrapping the terms 
"wanton character" indicating an "utter, heedless indifference" 
and substituting the phrases "gross deviation" and "substantial 
and unjustifiable risk" in the definition of recklessness and 
criminal negligence. 
II. TD AS 11. 11. 100. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF CULPABILITY 
Subsection (a) states the basic proposition of 
criminal law that a person is not subject to criminal sanctions 
unless he has performed at least a voluntary act or omission. 
Subsection (b) provides that a culpable mental state 
is required for each element of the offense "that necessarily 
requires a culpable mental state. " The quoted phrase is 
designed to emphasize that the Revised Code does not require 
a culpable mental state with respect to an element of an offense 
19. 
relating solely to the statute of limitations, jurisdiction, 
venue and the like. The effect of this provision is to 
eliminate all "strict liability" offenses from the Revised Code 
except as provided in subsections (b) (1) and (b) (2) . 
The rule that conduct unaccompanied by some form of 
culpable mental state is ordinarily insufficient to warrant 
the imposition of criminal penalties is well recognized in 
Alaska. 
In both Speidel v. State, supra, and State v. Campbell, 
supra, the Supreme Court recognized the principle that 
"although an act may have been objectively wrongful, the mind 
and will of the doer of the act may have been innocent. In 
such a case the person cannot be punished for a crime. 
Speidel, supra, at 80. Further, in �ampbell, at p. 112 the 
II 
Court noted that recent Criminal Code Revisions (notably in 
Oregon) had "demonstrate[d] a uniform sensitivity on the part 
of legislatures . . .  to the critical importance of incorporating 
the requisite criminal intent into newly created statutory 
offenses. " 
The effect of the failure to specify any requisite 
culpable mental state in many of the current Alaska criminal stat­
utes which do not codify common law crimes was well demonstrated 
in Campbell. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a 
challenged statute was " . constitutionally defective and 
invalid because of its omission of the requirement of 
criminal intent. " Campbell, supra, at 113. 
20. 
Subsections (b) (1) and (b) (2) set forth the exceptions 
to the requirement of a culpable mental state. Subsection 
(b) (1) (A} provides that no culpable mental state is required 
for any element of an offense which is a violation (a noncriminal 
offense) unless a culpable mental state is expressly included 
in the definition of the offense. 
Subsection (b) (1) (B) provides that no culpable mental 
state is required of �ny element of an offense if the statute 
is expressly designated as one of "strict liability. " However, 
the legislature 's power to create strict liability offenses is 
limited by Speidel, supra. 
Subsection (b) (2) provides that a culpable mental 
state is not required for a particular element of an offense 
if "an intent to dispense with the culpable mental state 
requirement for that element clearly appears. " 
III. TD AS 11.11. 110. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES WITH RESPECT 
TO CULPABILITY 
This statute sets out three rules of construction 
to be used in determining what particular culpable mental state 
is required for each element of an offense in the Revised Code. 
Subsection (a) provides that when one and only one 
culpable mental state appears in a statute defining an offense, 
"it is presumed to apply to every element of the offense, 
unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears." 
21. 
If a statute does not mention any culpable mental 
state, recklessness or a higher culpable mental state is 
required for each element of the offense, subject to the excep­
tions set forth in 11.11. l00 (b ) .  However, for criminal negligence 
to be sufficient as a mental state, it must be expressly i ncluded 
in the statute. It should be noted that, since "recklessness" 
does not apply to conduct, a defendant would have to perform 
conduct at least "knowingly" if no culpable mental state appears 
in the statute. 
Subsection (c) states the uncontroversial principle 
that if culpability of a "higher" degree than the kind of 
culpability required is established , the requirement of 
culpability is satisfied. 
IV. TD AS 11. 1 1. 1 20. EFFECT OF IGNORANCE OR MISTAKE UPON 
L IABILITY 
Subsection (a) states the universal principle that, 
ordinarily, ignorance of the law is no defense. Rotch v. U. S. , 
212 F.2d 280  (9th Cir. 1954) . This rule was acknowledged by 
the Alaska Supreme Court in Alex v. State, supra, at 681-68 2  
as follows :  
What is essential is not an awareness that a 
given conduct is a "wrongdoing" i n  the sense that 
it is proscribed by law, but rather an awareness 
that one is committing the specific acts which are 
defined by law as "wrongdoing". It is, however, 
no defense that one was not aware his  acts were 
wrong in the sense that they were proscribed by 
law. 
22 . 
Subsection (b) lists three situations in which a 
mistaken belief of fact precludes criminal liability . 
Subsection (b) (1) precludes liability when a 
mistake of fact prevents the person from acting with the 
particular mental state necessary for the crime. For example, 
pursuant to TD AS 1 1. 46. 020, theft requires an "intent to 
deprive another of property. '' A person who accidentally picks 
up another's raincoat mistakenly believing it to be his own has 
not committed theft, because he has not acted with the required 
intent. 
Subsection (b) (2) provides that mistake of fact is a 
defense to a crime whenever the statute defining the crime, or 
a related statute, clearly provides the defense. For example, 
it is a defense to theft that the defendant reasonably, though 
mistakenly, believed that he was entitled to the property. 
TD AS 11. 46. 040. 
Subsection (3) recognizes that conduct is justified 
if the defendant reasonably believed circumstances existed 
which would have supported a defense of justification as pro­
vided by chapter 21, even though that assessment was based on 
a mistake of fact. See, Commentary to chapter 2 1, infra. 
V. TD AS 11. 11. 130. INTOXICATION OR DRUG USE AS DEFENSE 
This section restates in terms consistent with 
the Revised Code the rule, now contained in AS 11. 70. 030, 
that evidence of intoxication is relevant in determining whether 
2 3. 
a defendant had a culpable mental state at the time of a 
criminal act. 
One substantive change is made in the proposed section 
from the current statute. Presently, a drug use defense could 
not be raised unless the drug was used in violation of AS 17. 10 
or AS 17. 12. The Subcommission concluded that the defense should 
not be limited in this manner. If the drug use negatives an 
element of the crime that requires a culpable mental state, the 
defense should be available regardless of the legality of the 
drug us2. It should not be available only to illegal drug users. 
Subsection (b) provides, in effect, that a defendant 
acts recklessly, although he is unaware of a risk, if his 
unawareness is the result of voluntary intoxication. The 
reckless offender is aware of and "consciously disregards" it. 
The criminally negligent offender is not aware of the risk 
created ; therefore he cannot consciously disregard it . The 
New York commentary provides this illustration of how an o:ffender 
can act with both forms of culpability : 
[T ] he driver of a car . . .  stops at a bar, drinks 
heavily, continues on his way and then runs over 
a pedestrian whom he fails to see in his intoxi­
cated condition and whom he undoubtedly would have 
seen had he been sober. Here, his culpability 
goes well beyond his failure of perception at the 
time of the accident. By getting drunk in the 
course of his automobile trip, he consciously 
disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
of accident and, hence, in the overall setting, 
he acted "recklessly". 
New York Penal Law § 15. 05, Commentary at 31. 
24 . 
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SECTION 
100 
llO 
CHAPTER 16. PARTIES TO CRIME 
Liability Based on Conduct 
Liability Based on Conduct of Another : Complicity 
120 Exceptions to Criminal Liability for Conduct of Another 
130 Criminal Liability of Organizations 
140 Criminal Liability of an Individual for Organization Conduct 
Sec. 11.16.100. LIABILITY BASED UPON CONDUCT. A person is guilty 
of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of 
another person for which he is legally accountable, or by both. 
Sec . 11.16. 110 . LIABILITY BASED UPON THE CONDUCT OF ANOTHER : 
COMPLICITY. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another 
person constituting an offense if 
(1) he is made legally accountable by a provision of law 
defining the offense ; or 
(2) with intent to promote  or facilitate the commission of 
the offense 
(A) he solicits or commands the other person to commit 
the offense; 
(B) he aids or abets the other person in planning or 
committing the offense ; or 
(C) having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the 
offense, he fails to make an effort he is legally required to make. 
Sec. 11.16. 120. EXEMPTIONS TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR CONDUCT OF 
ANOTHER. (a) Except as otherwise provided by a provision of law 
defining an offense, a person is not legally accountable for the conduct 
of another constituting an offense if 
(1) he is the victim of that offense; 
(2) the offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably 
2 5 . 
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incidental to its commission ; or 
(3) under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete 
renunci ation of his criminal intent, he terminated his complicity before 
the commission of the offense and 
(A) wholly deprived his complicity of its e�fectiveness 
in the commis sion of the offense; or 
(B) gave timely warning to law enforcement authorities 
or otherwise made proper effort to prevent the commission of the 
offense. 
(b) In a prosecution for an offense in which criminal liability is 
based upon the conduct of another person, it is not a defense that 
(1) the other person has not been prosecuted for or convicted 
of an offense based upon the conduct in question or has been convicted 
of a different offense or degree of offense; 
(2 ) the offense, as defined, can be committed only by a 
particular class or classes of persons to which the defendant does not 
belong, and he is for that reason legally incapable of committing the 
crime in an individual capacity ; or 
(3) the other person is not guilty of the offense because of 
(A) lack of criminal responsibility or other legal 
incapacity or exception; 
(B)  unawareness of the criminal nature of the conduct in 
question or of the defendant ' s  criminal purpose ; or 
(C)  any other factor precluding the culpable mental 
state required for the commission of the offense. 
(c) The defense provided by (a) (3)  of this section is an affirma­
tive defense. A renunciation under ( a ) (3) of this section is not 
"voluntary and complete" if it is motivated in whole or in part by 
(1) a belief that circumstances exist which increase the 
26 . 
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probability of detection or apprehension of the defendant or another 
participant in the criminal enterprise ,  or which render more difficult 
the accomplishment of the criminal purpose;  or 
(2) a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until another 
time or to transfer the criminal effort to another victim or another but 
similar objective. 
Sec. 11. 16 . 130. CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF ORGANIZATIONS. 
organization is guilty of an offense if 
(a) An 
(1) the conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an 
agent of the organization while acting within the scope of his employ­
ment or in behalf of the organization and the offense is a misdemeanor 
or a violation, or the offen se is one defined by a statute that clearly 
indicates a legislative intent to impose criminal liability on an 
organization; 
(2) the conduct constituting the offense consists of an omis­
sion to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on 
the organization by law; or 
(3) the conduct constituting the offense is knowingly engaged 
in , authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, ratified or tolerated 
by the board of directors of a corporation or by the executive board of 
other types of organizations or by a high managerial agent acting within 
the scope of his employment or in behalf of the organization. 
(b) In this section 
(1) "agent" means any director , officer or employee of an 
organization, or any other person who is authorized to act in behalf of 
the organization; 
(2) "high managerial agent" means an officer of an organiza­
tion who exercis e s  authority with respect to the formulation of organi­
zational policy , or a supervisor acting in the capacity of manager of 
2 7. 
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subordinate employee s ,  or any other agent in a position of comparable 
authority. 
Sec. 11.16.140. CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF AN INDIVIDUAL FOR ORGANIZA­
TION CONDUCT. A person i s  criminally liable for conduct constituting an 
o ffense which he performs or causes  to be p erformed in the name o f  or in 
behalf of an organization to the same extent as i f  that conduct were 
performed in  his own name or behalf. 
2 8 .  
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 16  - PARTIES TO A CRIME 
COMMENTARY 
The Effect of the Revised Code on the Existing Law of 
Parties to a Crime 
In defining those circumstances in which a person 
or organization may be criminally liable for the conduct 
of another, Chapter 16 of the Revised Code : 
1. Codifies the numerous Alaska Supreme Court 
decisions which determine when a person is legally 
accountable for the conduct of another. Existing 
statutes in this area are at such a high level 
of generality that they are difficult to apply 
to actual cases. As a result, numerous appeals 
have been required to clarify their application. 
The Revised Code codifies these holdings into a 
more accessible form. 
2. Settles areas of silence in the existing law of 
parties to a crime, such as the defense of renunci­
ation, by specifically recognizing or excluding 
various defenses which may or may not have been 
recognized at common law and which otherwise would 
require appeals for clarification. 
SECTION ANALYSIS OF REVISED CODE 
I .  TD AS 11. 16. 100 - LIABILITY BASED UPON CONDUCT 
TD AS 11. 16. 100 restates the basic principle that 
29 . 
criminal liability is based upon conduct. When criminal 
liability exists, it is immaterial whether the elements of 
the crime are satisfied by the defendant ' s  own behavior, 
or by the behavior of another person for which he is accountable, 
or by both. Anthony v. State, 521 P. 2d 486 (AK 1974) . 
This treatment is consistent with existing AS 1 2. 15 .010, 
which abolishes the distinction between accessories before 
the fact and principals, but not accessories after the 
fact. 
The subject of accessories after the fact is not 
covered in this chapter; such behavior amounts to an inter­
ference with the administration of justice and is dealt with 
in Chapter 56 of the Revised Code. 
II. TD AS 11. 16. 1 10 - LIABILITY BASED UPON THE CONDUCT 
OF ANOTHER : COMPLICITY 
There is no statute in existing law similar to 
TD AS 11. 16. 110 which sets forth the basis of legal accounta­
bility for the behavior of another. Nevertheless, a substantial 
number of cases have been decided in Alaska which have 
examined this subject. See, e. g. , Evans v. State, 550 
P. 2d 830 (AK 1976) ; Q�niels v. Stat� , 5 27 P. 2d 459 (AK 1974) 
Anthony v .  State, supra. Relying substantially on these 
cases, TD AS 11. 16. 110 sets out the circumstances under 
which a person may be criminally liable for the conduct of 
another. 
Subsection (1) recognizes that liability may be 
imposed on one person for the conduct of another in a specific 
30. 
statute. For example, TD AS ll . 16. 130 (a) provides that an 
organization (which is included in the definition of "person") is 
liable under certain circumstances for the acts of its agents. 
Subsection (2) codifies the current case law that 
one is liable as a traditional "accomplice" only if he acts 
"with intent to pror:tote or facilitate the commission of the 
offense". Tarneff v. State, 512 P.2d 923, 928 (AK 1973), 
citing Thomas v. State, 391 P.2d 18, 25 (AK 1964). Acting 
with that intent, the defendant must, under the Revised 
Code, either "solicit or command" the offense, "aid or abet" 
the offense or fail to make an effort to prevent the offense 
which he is legally required to make. These required acts 
are consistent with Alaska Supreme Court decisions which have 
held defendants to be accomplices when they solicit a crime, 
Anthony v. State, supra, or when they "aid, abet, assist or 
participate in the crime . . .  " Galauska v. State, supra, at 
p. 468. 
Under both the Revised Code and existing law, a 
person is liable as an accomplice only if some criminal act 
is committed. If a person does no more than solicit another 
to perform a criminal act, and conduct which would constitute 
a crime never occurs, he commits the crime of Solicitation, 
TD AS 11. 31. 110 . 
With regard to Subsection (B), the terms "aids" 
and "abets" have been included without definition since they 
have been interpreted in a number of cases. [ See, Beavers v. 
State, 4 92 P. 2d 88, 97 (AK 1971) ; Taylor v. State, 391 P.2d 950 
3 1 . 
(AK 1964) ; Mahle v. State, 371 P.2d 2 1, 2 5  (AK 1962) ; Daniels v. 
State, 383 P. 2d 323,  324 (AK 1963) , cert. denied 375 U. S. 
979 (1964) ] .  
Subsection (c) provides that liability is imposed 
on a person who has a legal duty to act but fails to do so. 
For example, at common law a person had a duty to protect 
his spouse if possible. Thus, a husband who stood by while 
another raped his wife was held guilty as an accomplice to 
the rape. People v. Chapman, 62 Mich. 280 , 28 NW 896 (1886) 
III. TD AS 11. 16. 120 - EXEMPTIONS TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR 
CONDUCT OF ANOTHER 
A. Subsection (a) Exemptions from Liability 
Subsection (a) provides for exemptions to the 
general principals of TD AS 11. 16.110. The first two 
exemptions are well recognized throughout the United States. 
The third deals with a situation on which there is a greater 
division of authority. 
The first exemption, providing that the victim 
of an offense is not criminally liable as an "accomplice" 
appears in paragraph (1) . This exemption was examined in 
the Commentary to the Oregon Revised Criminal Code . 
It seems clear that the victim of a crime 
should not be held as an accomplice in its per­
petration, though his conduct in a sense assists 
in the commission of the crime. �he businessman 
who yields to the extortion of a racketeer, the 
parent who pays ransom to the kidnapper, may be 
unwise or even may be thought immoral ; [ but] to 
view them as involved in the commission of the 
32. 
crime confounds the policy embodied in the pro­
hibition; it is laid down, wholly or in part, 
for their protection. 
ORS §161. 165, Commentary at 1 4. 
The j ustification for the exclusion in paragraph 
(2) of conduct which is inevitably incidental to the crime, 
is also well stated in the Oregon commentary: 
Exclusion of the victim does not wholly 
meet the problems that arise .. . .  Should the man 
who has intercourse with a prostitute be viewed 
as an accomplice in the act of prostitution, the 
purchaser an accomplice in the unlawful sale, 
the unmarried party to a bigamous marriage an 
accomplice of the bigamist, the bribe giver an 
accomplice of the taker? 
ORS §161. 165, Commentary at 14-15. 
Of course, conduct which is "inevitably incidental" 
to the commission of an offense may itself be made a crime, 
e. g. , AS 11. 56. 110, Bribery. Paragraph (2) merely provides 
that such conduct by itself does not automatically give rise 
to accomplice liability. 
Paragraph (3) is based on the view that even 
though action sufficient for complicity may have occurred, 
the law should provide that liability may be averted if the 
reason for liability disappears before the crime has been 
committed. This defense is commonly referred to as "renunci-
ation". Unlike the defenses provided in paragraphs (1) and 
( 2) ,  the defense of renunciation is an affirmative defense 
which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
Subsection ( 3) ( A )  provides that a "voluntary and 
complete" renunciation, as defined in subsection (c) , 
3 3 .  
combined with steps whi ch successfuly deprive one 's complicity 
of all its effectiveness in the commission of the offense, 
removes liability. Of course, the action necessary to 
deprive one ' s  conduct of effectiveness will vary with the 
ctccessorial behavior . For- example, if the accompl ice 
provides guns,  a statement of withdrawal is not sufficient. 
What is important is that he get back the weapons. 
It is contemplated that there will be some 
situations where the only way that the accomplice can deprive 
his conduct of its effectiveness is to make independent 
efforts to prevent the crime. Consequently, subsection (3) 
(B) provides that if the accomplice gives "timely" warning 
to the police he will avoid liability for the crime. A 
"timely" warning is one which notifies the police 
in time to prevent the commission of the crime if they act 
upon that warning. 
Finally, an accomplice may also avoid liability 
by making "proper effort to prevent the commission of the 
crime. " For example, the accomplice who supplies a gun to 
be used in a planned bank robbery may avoid liability by 
warning the bank manager of the planned crime a day before 
it is to occur. 
The basic rationale supporting the adoption of 
the renunciation defense, as well as its relationship to 
existing law, i s  discussed in this repor t in the commentary 
to TD AS 11. 31. l00 (c) , infra, discussing a similar renunci-
ation provision applicable to attempt. 
34. 
B. Subsection (c) - No Defense 
Subsection (c) lists three situations which the 
Revised Code specifically excludes as defenses to liability 
for the conduct of another. 
Subsection (1) eliminates the accessory ' s  common 
law defense that the principal has not been convicted. 
Alaska, like most jurisdictions, has abolished the distinction 
between principals and accessories before the fact, AS 12. 15 . 010, 
and with it this defense. 
Subsection (2) acknowledges the generally accepted 
principle that a person who is not capable in his individual 
capacity of committing an offense may nevertheless be liable 
for the behavior of another who has the capacity to commit 
that crime. This principle is identified in other specific 
sections of the Revised Code, such as TD AS ll. 4 1. 4 00 (b) . 
Subsection (3) recognizes that a person is never­
theless guilty of the commission of a crime when the person 
he aids could not be convicted of the crime because of some 
legal disability such as youth or mental condition. 
III. TD AS 11. 16. 130 ;  140 - CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF ORGANIZATIONS: 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF AN INDIVIDUAL FOR ORGANIZATION CONDUCT 
TD AS 11. 16. 130 indicates the circumstances in 
which an organization may be held criminally liable. Because 
an organization cannot be imprisoned, the Revised Code will 
contain a specific provision covering fines for organizations 
convicted of an offense. It is expected that these fines 
will be collected in the manner authorized by civil law. 
3 5. 
"Organization" is defined in Chapter 06 as " a  legal entity, 
and shall include a corporation, company, association, firm, 
partnership, joint stock company, foundation, institution, 
society, union, club, church, or any other group of persons 
organized for any purpose. " TD AS 11. 06. 010 ( 7) .  
Subsection (a) (1) indicates the offenses for 
which an organization may be held criminally liable because 
of the conduct of an agent acting within the scope of his 
employment or in behalf of the organization. 
This provision may expand the principle of respondeat 
superior to impose liability on an organization when its 
agent is acting either within the scope of his employment 
or in behalf of the organization. However, liability based 
on subsection (a) (1) is limited to offenses that are misde­
meanors or violations. Any exceptions to this limitation 
must be clearly indicated by the legislature in a statute 
imposing liability on an organization for its ' agent ' s  felony. 
Subsection (a) (2) affirms the responsibility of 
an organization for the commission of an offense through 
omission of a duty specifically imposed on that organization 
by law. 
Subsection (a) (3) states a basis for liability 
that relates more to the actual responsibility of the 
organization that the theory of respondeat superior. It 
provides that the organization is responsible for activities 
which were known specifically to high organization executives. 
36. 
Presently, there is no specific statutory pro­
visions dealing with organizational oriminal liability. 
However, existing AS 11. 75. 070 defines ' 'person tt to include 
corporations as well as natural persons. The Subcommission 
concluded that the considerations which support holding 
corporations liable for crimes apply equally to organizations 
which happen to be unincorporated. This conclusion is 
embodied in the Proposed Federal Criminal Code § 402 and 
the Revised Arkansas Criminal Code § 4 1-402. 
37. 
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CHAPTER 21 . GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTIFICATION. 
SECTION 
100 
110 
120 
130 
140 
150 
160  
170  
180 
190 
200 
210 
220 
230 
Justification : Burden o f  Inj ecting the Is sue 
Justification : Performance of Public Duty 
Justification :  Neces sity 
[ reserved] 
Justification : Use o f  Physical Force in Defense of Self 
Justification : Use of Physical Force in Defense of  Third Perso 
Justification : Use of  Physical Force in Defense of  Premises 
Justification : Use of  Physical Force in Defense of  Property 
Justification : Use o f  Physical Force by Peace Officer in 
Making an Arrest or Preventing an Escape 
Justification : 
Justification : 
Justification : 
Justification : 
Duress  
Entrapment 
Use of  Physical Force by Private Person in 
As sisting an Arrest or Preventing an Escape 
Use of Physical Force by Private Person in 
Making an Arrest or Preventing an Escape 
Use of Physical Force in Resisting Arrest 
Use o f  Physical Force to Prevent Escape from 
Correctional Facility 
[ reserved] 
[reserved] 
Sec. 11. 21. 100 . JUSTIFICATION : BURDEN OF INJECTING THE ISSUE. In 
any pro secution for an offense, the defendant shall have the burden of 
injecting the is sue of  a defense o f  j ustification as defined in secs. 
110 - 210 o f  this chapter. 
Sec. 11.21.110 .  JUSTIFICATION : PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC DUTY . 
[ reserved ] 
Sec . 11.21.120. JUSTIFICATION : NECESSITY. Conduct which would 
otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of necessity to the 
extent permitted by common law when 
(1) neither this title nor other statute defining the offense 
provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the justification of  
3 8 .  
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necessity in the specific situation involved; and 
(2)  a legislative purpose to exclude the justification of 
necessity does not otherwise plainly appear. 
Sec .  1 1.2 1 . 130.  JUSTIFICATION : USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE IN DEFENSE 
OF SELF. (a) A person may , subject to the provisions of (b) and ( c) 
of this section, use or threaten to use physical force upon another 
person when and to the extent he reasonably believes it necessary to 
defend himself from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminen 
use of unlawful physical force by the other person, unless 
( 1) the physical force invo lved is the product of mutual 
combat not authorized by law ; 
(2)  the person claiming the defense o f  justification provoked 
the other person ' s  conduct with intent to cause physical injury to the 
other person; or 
(3) the person claiming the defense of justification was the 
initial aggressor . 
(b) In circumstances described in (a) of this section, the person 
c laiming the defense of j ustification may use physical force if he has 
withdrawn from the encounter and effectively communicated his withdrawal 
to the other person, but the other person persists in continuing the 
incident by the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force . 
(c) A person may, subject to the provisions of (d) of this section 
use or threaten to use deadly physical force upon another person when an 
to the extent he reasonably believes it necessary to defend himself from 
what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use by the other 
person of unlawful 
( 1) physical force while the other person is committing or 
attempting to commit a kidnapping, a robbery, or a sexual assault under 
AS ll . 41 . 410 (a) (l) or ll . 41 . 4 20 (a) (l) ; or 
39 . 
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(2) deadly physical force . 
(d) A person may not use deadly physical force if he knows that 
he can with complete s afety as to himself and others avoid the neces­
sity of so doing by retreating, except there is no duty to retreat if 
the person is 
(1) in his dwelling and not the initial aggressor;  or 
(2) a peace officer or a person ass isting a peace officer 
under sec . 180 of this chapter. 
Sec. 11 . 21.140 . JUSTIFICATION : USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE IN DEFENSE 
OF A THIRD PERSON. A person may use or threaten to use physical force 
upon another person when and to the extent he reasonably believes it 
necessary to defend a third person when, under the circumstances as the 
per son claiming the defense of j ustification reasonably believes them 
to be, the third person would be justified under s ec. 130 of this chapt 
in using or threatening to use that degree of physical force to defend 
himself . 
Sec. 11.21.150. JUSTIFICATION :  USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE IN DEFENSE 
OF PREMISES. (a) A person may use  or threaten to use nondeadly physi­
cal force upon another person when and to the extent he reasonably 
believes it necessary to prevent or terminate what he reasonably be­
lieves to be the commission or attempted commis sion by the other person 
of a crime involving damage to premises. He may use or threaten to use  
deadly physical force when and to  the extent he reasonably believes it 
necessary to prevent or terminate what h e  reasonably believes to be the 
commission or attempted commiss ion of arson upon a dwelling or occupied 
building. 
(b) A person in possession or control of any premises, or an 
expre s s  or implied agent of that person, may use  or threaten to use 
nondeadly physical force upon another person when and to the extent h e  
4 0 . 
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reasonably believes it necessary to prevent or terminate what he reason­
ably believes to be the commission or attempted commission by the other 
person of a criminal trespass upon the premises. 
(c) A person may use or threaten to use physical force upon anothe 
person when and to the extent he reasonably believes it necessary to 
terminate what he reasonably believes to be a burglary in a dwelling or 
occupied building. 
Sec. 11.21.160. JUSTIFICATION: USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE IN DEFENSE 
OF PROPERTY. (a) A person Qay use or threaten to use nondeadly physi­
cal force upon another person when and to the extent he reasonably 
believes it necessary to prevent what he reasonably believes to be the 
commission or attempted coQIDission by the other person of any degree of 
theft, criminal mischief or criminal tampering. 
(b) A person may use deadly physical force under circumstances 
described in (a) of this section only when the use of deadly physical 
force is authorized under other sections of this chapter. 
Sec. 11.21.170. JUSTIFICATION: USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE BY PEACE 
OFFICER IN MAKING AN ARREST OR PREVENTING AN ESCAPE. (a) A peace offi­
cer need not retreat or desist from efforts to effect the arrest, or 
from efforts to prevent the escape from custody, of a person he reason­
ably believes to have committed an offense because of resistance or 
threatened resistance of the arrestee. In addition to using or threat­
ening to use physical force authorized under other sections of this 
chapter, a peace officer is, subject to the provisions of (b) and (c) 
of this section, justified in using or threatening to use physical 
force when he reasonably believes it necessary to effect an arrest, to 
prevent an escape from custody, or to effect a lawful stop. 
(b) A peace officer in effecting an arrest or in preventing an 
escape from custody is justified in using deadly physical force only 
41. 
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when 
(1) deadly physical force is authorized under other sections 
of this chapter; or 
(2) the peace officer reasonably believes it necessary to 
effect the arrest or prevent the escape of a person he reasonably be­
lieves 
(A) has committed or attempted to commit a felony 
involving the use or threatened use of physical force against a 
person; 
(B) is attempting to escape while in possession of a 
deadly weapon on or about his person; or 
(C) may otherwise endanger life or inflict serious 
physical injury unless arrested without delay. 
(c) Using or threatening to use physical force in making an arres 
is not justified under this section unless the peace officer reasonably 
believes the arrest is lawful. 
Sec. 11. 21.180. JUSTIFICATION: USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE BY PRIVATE 
PERSON ASSISTING AN ARREST OR PREVENTING AN ESCAPE. (a) Subject to 
the provisions of (b) of this section, a person who has been directed 
by a person he reasonably believes to be a peace officer to assist him 
in making an arrest or preventing an escape from custody is justified 
in using or threatening to use physical force when and to the extent 
that he reasonably believes it necessary to carry out the peace offi­
cer's direction. 
(b) A person who has been directed to assist one whom he reason­
ably believes to be a peace officer under circwnstances specified in 
(a) of this section may use or threaten to use deadly physical force to 
make an arrest or to prevent an escape only when 
(1) use of deadly physical force is authorized under other 
42. 
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sections of this chapter; or 
(2) the person is directed or authorized by the peace officer 
to use deadly physical force unless he knows that the peace officer him­
self is not authorized to use deadly physical force under the circum­
stances. 
Sec. 11.21.190. JUSTIFICATION: USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE BY PRIVATE 
PERSON IN MAKING ARREST OR PREVENTING ESCAPE. (a) Subject to (b) of 
this section and to the extent authorized by AS 12.25.030, a person, 
acting on his own account, may use or threaten to use physical force to 
effect the arrest or prevent the escape from custody of a person who he 
reasonably believes has committed an offense in his presence when and 
to the extent he reasonably believes it necessary to effect an arrest, 
or to prevent an escape from custody. 
(b) A person in effecting an arrest or in preventing an escape 
from custody is justified in using or threatening to use deadly physical 
force only 
(1) when it is authorized under other sections of this 
chapter; or 
(2) when and to the extent he reasonably believes it neces­
sary to effect the arrest of a person who he reasonably believes has 
committed murder, manslaughter, robbery or sexual assault under AS ll.-
41.410(a)(l) or ll.41.420(a)(l) or who is in immediate flight after 
commission of one of these crimes. 
Sec. 11.21.200. JUSTIFICATION: USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE IN RESISTING 
ARREST. A person may not use or threaten to use physical force to re­
sist an arrest by a peace officer who is known by him, or reasonably 
appears, to be a peace officer, whether the arrest is lawful or unlawful 
unless the physical force used by the peace officer exceeds that al­
lowed by sec. 170 of this chapter. 
43. 
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Sec. 11.21.210. JUSTIFICATION: USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE TO PREVENT 
ESCAPE FROM CORRECTIONAL FACILITY. A guard or other peace officer em­
ployed in a correctional facility may use or threaten to use physical 
force upon another person when and to the extent he reasonably believes 
it necessary to prevent the escape of a prisoner from a correctional 
facility. 
Sec. 11.21.220. 
Sec. 11.21.230. 
DURESS. [reserved] 
ENTRAPMENT. [reserved] 
44. 
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 21. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTIFICATION 
COMMENTARY 
The Effect of the Revised Code Provisions on the Existing 
Law of Justification 
In defining the various defenses of justification, 
the General Principles of Justification Article: 
1. Codifies an area of law which under our 
present statutes is for the most part left 
to the common law research skills of ·the judge, 
the argument of attorneys and to the unfettered 
imagination of all other citizens. 
2. Sets out the circumstances under which the use of 
force is justified rather than constituting a 
crime. The use of force is classified according 
to whether it is "physical force" or, a special 
level of physical force: "deadly physical force. " 
The justifiable use of deadly physical force is 
limited to certain carefully defined situations. 
3. Provides that a person's otherwise justifiable conduct 
is not rendered criminal if it is based upon a reason­
able, though mistaken, belief that certain circum­
stances exist. Under the existing "justifiable 
homicide" statutes, a person claiming the defense 
must be correct in his evaluation of the circumstances 
45. 
justifying the use of force. For instance, to 
justify the use of force in making an arrest, a 
felony in fact must have been committed. The Revised 
Code is based on the principle that a "reasonable 
belief" as to circumstances is sufficient. Thus, the 
peace officer who reasonably believes that a felony 
has been committed will be justified in using force 
in making an arrest even though his evaluation of 
the circumstances may have been mistaken. 
4. Broadens an existing provision which permits the 
use of force only in defense of a narrow class of 
persons related to the defender. The Revised Code 
will allow a person to use force in defense of 
anyone. 
5. Clarifies existing law by explicitly allowing the 
use of physical force in defense of property while 
ordinarily prohibiting the use of deadly physical 
force except in defense of a person's home. 
6. Provides that a peace officer may use deadly physical 
force in making an arrest based on the officer's 
reasonable assessment that the person to be arrested 
is dangerous, while providing that only non-deadly 
physical force may be used to arrest a person who 
has committed a non-violent felony and who is other­
wise unlikely to inflict serious injury. 
7. Recognizes that an escape from a correctional facility 
46. 
usually poses a greater danger to society than an 
escape from a peace officer by providing that a 
guard or peace officer employed in a correctional 
facility may use any necessary degree of physical 
force to prevent an escape from a correctional 
facility. 
Use of terms "physical force," "deadly physical force" and 
"non-deadly physical force" in Justification chapter 
Key to the Justification Article of the Revised Code 
are three terms - "physical force," "deadly physical force" 
and "non-deadly physical force. " 
"Physical force" is defined in the General Provisions 
Article, Chapter 06, as "force used upon or directed toward the 
body of another person; the term includes confinement. " "Deadly 
physical force" means "physical force that under the circum­
stances in which used is capable of causing death or serious 
physical injury." 
The phrase "use or threaten to use physical force" 
covers situations in which any degree of force may be appropriate 
including deadly force. Thus, sections of the Tentative Draft 
which allow the defense also refer specifically to the use of 
deadly force. For example, TD AS 11. 21. 130 provides that a 
person may "use or threaten to use physical force" in self­
defense but specifically recognizes that the use of force is 
"subject to the provisions of (c) of this section, " which 
47. 
limits the use of "deadly physical force" to specifically 
defined situations. See, discussion of self-defense at§ II B, 
infra. 
Any use of force is justifiable only "when and to 
the extent [the person claiming the defense] reasonably believes 
it necessary." Therefore, even though the use of "deadly 
physical force" may be authorized in a particular section, it 
is not justified if the person claiming the defense believed 
at that time that he could accomplish his purpose by the use 
of non-deadly force. 
SECTION ANALYSIS OF REVISED CODE 
I. TD AS 11. 21. 120. JUSTIFICATION: NECESSITY 
Though the defense of necessity has long been 
recognized at common law, there is no existing statute or case 
law on the subject in Alaska. 
Under the necessity defense, conduct which would 
otherwise be criminal may be justifiable if the actor avoids 
a greater injury by engaging in that conduct. Examples of pos­
sible application of the necessity defense would include blasting 
a building to prevent a major fire from spreading or forcibly 
restraining a person infected with a highly contagious and 
dangerous disease. 
The most important issues regarding the necessity 
defense are whether it should be codified, and, if so, with 
what degree of detail. See, The Necessity Defense, 52 DENVER 
L. J. 874 (1975). 
48. 
While most revised codes have codified the defense 
[see, ORS 161. 200, N. Y. Penal Law§ 35. 05 (2) ] the Subcommission 
followed the New Jersey approach by declining to adopt a 
detailed statutory formulation. Instead, the necessity 
defense was incorporated into the Revised Code "to the extent 
permitted by common law" with the qualifications described in 
subsections (1) and (2) . 
The Subcommission concluded, as did the Commentary to 
the New Jersey Code, that " it is more appropriate to leave 
this issue to the judiciary. the rarity of the defense 
and the imponderables of the particulars of specific cases 
convinces us that the Courts can better define and apply this 
defense than can be done through legislation. " The Necessity 
Defense, supra. 
II. TD AS 11. 21. 130. JUSTIFICATION: USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE 
IN DEFENSE OF SELF 
A. Existing Law 
A literal reading of AS 11. 15. 100 might suggest that a 
homicide is always justifiable to prevent the commission of any 
felony upon oneself. However, the Alaska Supreme Court has 
held that '' [i]f the statute were so interpreted it would be 
in conflict with all . . .  the law of self-defense. We adopt 
the Oregon interpretation of this statute which requires a 
finding of necessity before the homicide can be justifiable. " 
Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897 (AK 1970). 
49. 
Thus, while the existing statute seems to provide 
an unchecked grant of authority to use deadly physical force 
in self-defense, that authority is significantly limited by 
the implied requirement of "necessity" found by the Supreme 
Court in the statute. 
Though existing AS 11. 15. 100 is too broad in one 
respect, it is also too restrictive in a number of situations. 
The existing statute provides that a homicide may 
be justifiable in self-defense, but it provides no guidance to 
the person who is a victim of a less than deadly assault. How 
far can a person go in self-defense? Unfortunately, the 
existing statutes provide no guidelines and offer no community 
value judgments concerning the extent to which force can be 
used and under what circumstances. 
While purporting to explain the law of justification, 
however vaguely, whenever a person is acting to prevent the 
commission of a felony upon himself, AS 11. 15. 100 says nothing 
about the use of physical force to defend against an assault 
that is only a misdemeanor. A persistent student of the law 
will find that situation partially addressed in Title 12, the 
Criminal Procedure Code. The statute, "Resistance to 
Commission of Crime, " AS 12. 60. 010, allows "lawful resistance 
to the commission of a crime by the party about to be injured, 
or by another person in aid or defense of the person about to 
be injured to prevent (1) a crime against his person or his 
family . . . .  " So under present law, if a victim knows what 
so. 
kind of resistance is '' lawful", he may use it to protect a 
special class of persons. 
B. The Code Provision 
TD AS 11. 21. 130 formulates statutory guidelines to 
be followed in determining when and to what degree a person 
is justified in using physical force against another in self­
defense. 
1. Degree of Force 
Subsection (a) allows a person to defend himself 
from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent 
use of unlawful physical force. Subject to the limitations 
on the use of deadly physical force, he may exercise that 
degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary. 
Paragraphs (1) - (3) qualify the right of a person 
to use physical force in self-defense. Under paragraph (1), 
neither party to mutual combat which is not authorized by law 
can claim self-defense; both parties are guilty of assault. 
Paragraph (2) prohibits a person from provoking another into 
using force, and later claiming that his use of force in self­
defense was justified. This is consistent with the existing 
rule "that a person who provokes a difficulty thereby forfeits 
his right to self-defense. " Gray, supra at 908. Finally, 
paragraph (3) prevents an initial aggressor from claiming 
self-defense. 
Subsection (b) provides that even in the three circum-
51. 
stances described in paragraphs (1) - (3) a person can neverthe­
less use physical force if he withdraws from the encounter and 
effectively communicates his withdrawal to the other person. If the 
other person continues the incident by the use or imminent use of 
physical force, physical force may be used in self-defense. 
Subsection (c) allows a person to use deadly physical 
force when he reasonably believes it necessary to defend himself 
from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use 
by another of deadly force, or any degree of force during the 
commission of a kidnapping, a robbery, or a forcible sexual 
assault. 
2. Duty to retreat 
There is currently no specifically stated duty to 
retreat in Alaska before one may use deadly physical force in 
self-defense. De Groot v. U S, 78 F. 2d 244 (9th Cir. 1935). 
However, it is likely that the presence of an obviously safe 
method of avoiding the encounter would have a bearing on a 
jury's determination on whether the use of deadly physical 
force was " necessary". Frank v. U S, 42 F. 2d 623 (9th Cir. 1930) 
The Subcommission determined that a greater degree of clarity 
was required without imposing a general duty to retreat in 
all situations. 
TD AS ll. 21. 130(d) requires a person to retreat prior to 
using deadly physical force "if he knows that he can with complete 
safety as to himself and to others avoid the [use of deadly 
physical force] by retreating. " Retreat is not required 
52. 
when the person is in his dwelling and not the original aggres­
sor or is a peace officer making an arrest or person assisting 
the officer. There is no duty to retreat prior to using non­
deadly physical force. Further, the defendant must "know" 
that he has a safe retreat; it is not sufficient that a reason­
able person would have believed he could retreat safely. 
III. TD AS 11. 21. 140. DEFENSE OF THIRD PERSON 
Under existing law, AS 11. 15. 100 (1), a homicide is 
justifiable only if it is committed in defense of a third 
person who stands in a certain relationship to the actor. For 
example, under this statute a homicide is justifiable if it is 
committed in defense of one's "master or mistress" but is criminal 
if committed in defense of one's grandmother. While AS 12. 60. 010 
may broaden that authority somewhat, even that statute appears to 
be limited '.. ri the de l:ense of ".fami ; y". 
The Revised Code allows a person to come to the aid 
of any third person when the rescuer reasonably believes that 
the third person would be justified in using physical force 
to defend himself. The intervenor may use that degree of 
physical force which he reasonably believes the third person 
would be justified in using in his own defense. 
In redefining these standards, the Subcornmission was 
conscious of the awakening sense of social interdependence and 
the value of "the good Samaritan, " the absence of which was 
symbolized by the "Kitty Genovese" case - a woman in New York 
53. 
who was stabbed to death while hundreds heard her cries a 
decade ago. 
IV. TD AS 11.21. 150; 160. JUSTIFICATION: USE OF PHYSICAL 
FORCE IN DEFENSE OF PREMISES: USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE IN DEFENSE 
OF PROPERTY 
A. Existing Law 
A literal reading of the existing "justifiable 
homicide" statute might lead a person to believe that he may 
kill another to prevent the commission of any felony upon his 
property: 
The killing of a human being is justifiable 
when committed by any person . . .  to prevent the 
commission of a felony upon his property, or upon 
property in his possession, or upon or in a dwelling 
house where he may be. AS 11. 15. 100(2). 
As defined in existing AS 01. 10. 0 60(9): '"Property' 
includes both real and personal property. " 
The existing Alaska statute is based on the now­
repealed Oregon provision, ORS 163. 100. However, the Oregon 
Supreme Court noted in dicta that a person is not justified 
in using deadly physical force solely in defense of property 
even before the Oregon Revised Code explicitly so provided. 
The defendant in his brief concedes that the use 
of a dangerous weapon is, as a matter of law, ex­
cessive force when used solely in the defense of 
property. This proposition is supported by the 
authorities. 
State v. Weber, 246 Or 312, 423 P. 2d 767, cert. denied 
389 us 86 3 (1967). 
54. 
The Weber opinion also approves this statement from 
1 Wharton, Criminal Law & Procedure 709: 
The use of a deadly weapon in protection of property 
is generally held, except in extreme cases, to be 
the use of more than justifiable force, and to render 
the owner of the property liable criminally for the 
assault. 
Weber, supra, at 319-320. 
The court then concludes by noting: 
The "extreme cases" ordinarily are those in which 
either the home is intruded upon or in which there 
is an imminent threat to person as well as property. 
Weber, supra, at 320. 
The opinion contains no mention of ORS 163. 100 and 
the point was not at issue in Weber, nor in any other 
Oregon or Alaska Case. A reasonable inference can be drawn 
from the opinion, notwithstanding the seemingly broad language 
of the repealed Oregon and existing Alaska statute, that the 
killing of a person solely to prevent the commission of a 
felony upon personal property would not be justifiable. 
Cf. , State v. Nodine, 259 P. 2d 1056 (Or 1953) . However, 
as noted in Weber, different considerations come into play when 
II . the home is intruded . or [when] there is an 
imminent threat to person as well as property. " The use of 
deadly physical force in defense of personal property is not an 
issue that should be left open to speculation as it is today. 
B. The Code Provisions 
1. TD AS 11. 21. 160 - DEFENSE OF PROPERTY 
TD AS 11. 21. 160 covers the limited situation of the 
use of force to prevent theft, criminal mischief or criminal 
55. 
tampering with property which is not a dwelling or occupied 
building. 
Consistent with the interpretation likely to be 
given existing AS 11.15. 100 (2) by the Alaska Supreme Court 
in light of Weber, supra, the Revised Code provides that a 
person may use only non-deadly physical force when the sole 
justification claimed is defense of property. 
Subsection (b) recognizes that a person defending 
property may be justified in using deadly physical force based 
on some other section of the Justification Chapter. For 
example, one who destroys a person's only means of transportation 
from a remote bush site has in effect used deadly force against 
the owner if the destruction creates a substantial risk of 
serious physical injury -- i. e. , exposure, starvation. In this 
case the use of deadly physical force in defense of the person 
(not property) would be appropriate under TD AS 11. 21.130. 
2. TD AS 11. 21.150 - DEFENSE OF PREMISES 
Under TD AS 11.21. 150, deadly physical force may be 
used in defense of premises when it is reasonably believed 
necessary " . . .  to prevent or terminate what [the person] 
reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted 
commission of arson upon a dwelling or occupied building, "  
TD AS ll. 21. 150 (a), "or when it is reasonably believed 
necessary . . .  to terminate what [the person] reasonably 
believes to be a burglary in a dwelling or occupied building." 
56. 
Only non-deadly force may be used to prevent or terminate a 
crime involving damage to premises not amounting to arson, or 
to prevent or terminate a criminal trespass. 
The Revised Code, in allowing a greater degree of 
physical force to be used by a person in defense of a dwelling 
than would be justifiable in defense of a person generally or 
in defense of property generally, is consistent with the 
traditional concept that "a man's home is his castle" which 
has long been favored by the law. This concept is expanded 
in the Revised Code to include the use of deadly physical 
force to prevent or terminate arson or to terminate the 
burglary of an occupied building. Because burglary and arson 
inherently involve a high potential for physical injury to the 
occupants of a building or dwelling, the use of physical force 
should not be limited by other than the requirement that the 
force is "reasonably believed necessary" to accomplish the 
prevention or termination of arson or the termination of 
burglary. 
After much discussion concerning problems of mistake 
when persons other than the owner of a dwelling or occupied 
building intervene in defense of premises, the Subcommission 
concluded that any person, not just the owner, should be 
allowed to use force to prevent damage to property or to 
prevent burglary. However, if the only crime is criminal 
trespass (usually, unlawful entry onto land) a person will be 
allowed to use force only if he is in possession or control 
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of the premises, or is an "express or implied agent' ' of the 
owner of the premises, a term broad enough to cover a person 
who discovers a trespasser on his neighbor's land. 
At a certain point, the seriousness of the offense 
is low enough that the relationship of the actor to the 
perceived offender and the property becomes significant. Any 
use of force involves the danger of escalating violence to a 
level of seriousness far beyond the original conduct. Where 
the actor has few or no significant ties with the situation, 
the risk of a mistake setting off a chain of serious conse­
quences outweighs the policy of encouraging the Samaritan. 
In considering the use of physical force in defense 
of premises and property, the topic of the use of '' spring guns" 
and similar traps was discussed. The Subcommission concluded 
that the use of such items is never justifiable if the device 
is capable of causing serious physical injury. To permit the 
use of such life-endangering devices in defense of property 
conflicts with one of the main requirements of the Justifica­
tion chapter -- that the person claiming the defense reasonably 
believe the use of force necessary. Because such traps will 
automatically be triggered whenever there is an intrusion 
into premises, a judgment on the necessity for using such 
force has not been made. The potential for unintended injury 
is too great to justify the use of such devices in defense 
of property or premises. 
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V. TD AS 11. 21. 170. JUSTIFICATION: USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE BY 
PEACE OFFICER IN MAKING AN ARREST OR PREVENTING ESCAPE 
A. Existing Law 
Currently a homicide is justifiable when committed 
II in the attempt, by lawful means, to arrest a person 
who has committed a felony. " AS 11. 15. 100 (3). However, 
this authority is subject to the limitation "that no peace 
officer or private person . may employ more than 
necessary force in making an arrest. 
4 7 3 P . 2 d 6 3 3 ( AK 19 7 0) ; AS 12 . 2 5 . 0 7 0 . 
II Wilson v. State, 
The common law distinction between felonies and 
misdemeanors is manifestly inadequate in determining when 
deadly physical force may be used in making an arrest and may 
be unconstitutional. Mattis v. Schnarr, __ F. 2d 
20 Crim L Rptr 2245. 
(8 Cir 1976); 
The felony-misdemeanor distinction arose hundreds 
of years ago when only a limited number of crimes were clas­
sified as felonies, with most involving a high danger to 
human life. Because the punishment for conviction of a common 
law felony was death, it did not appear particularly harsh to 
authorize a peace officer to use deadly physical force in 
effecting a felony arrest. Today, most crimes in existing 
law as well as in the Revised Code are classified as felonies. 
While some of these felonies involve the potential of danger 
to human life, others do not. 
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B. The Code Provision 
In subsection (a), the Revised Code recognizes that, 
subject to the limitations on the use of deadly physical force, 
a peace officer may always use or threaten to use physical 
force whenever he reasonably believes it necessary to effect 
an arrest or to prevent an escape from custody. Further, in 
providing that physical force may be used to effect a lawful 
stop, subsection (a) insures that a peace officer will not 
be criminally liable for an assault prosecution for conducting 
a lawful search for weapons of the kind described in Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968) when the use of physical force is 
necessary to accomplish this limited type of search. If in 
conducting this search, sufficient probable cause is established 
to warrant an arrest, the continued u5e of physical force will 
be justified if necessary to effectuate that arrest. 
Unlike existing law, the Revised Code does not 
require that the arrestee actually have committed the crime 
for the officer's use of force to be justified. The use of 
force will be justified if the peace officer reasonably, 
though mistakenly, believes that a crime has been committed. 
The first sentence of TD AS 11. 21. 160 makes it clear 
that a peace officer is under no duty to retreat in making an 
arrest, establishing an exception to the self-defense provision 
on retreat in TD AS ll. 21. 130 (d) (2). 
Subsections (a) and (b) (1) recognize that 
TD AS 11. 21. 170 supplements the other provisions in chapter 21 
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governing the justifiable use of physical force. For example, 
if in making an arrest the peace officer reasonably believes 
that t he use of force is necessary in self-defense, the provi­
sions of TD AS 11. 21. 130 will supplement the authority to use 
the force prescribed in this section. 
With regard to the issue of when deadly force may 
be used by a peace officer in making an arrest or preventing 
an escape from custody, the Revised Code makes several changes 
in existing law. 
Pursuant to paragraph (A) of subsection (b) (2), a 
peace officer may use deadly physical force when he reasonably 
believes it necessary to make an arrest or prevent the escape 
of a person he reasonably believes "has committed or attempted 
to commit a felony involving the use or threatened use of 
physical force against a person. " Under this paragraph, for 
example, the use of deadly physical force would be justified 
in arresting a fleeing burglar, robber or a person who has 
committed or attempted to commit an assault involving physical 
injury but would not be justified in using deadly force to 
arrest a person who the officer believes has committed a non­
violent felony such as forgery or theft, unless the deadly 
force is justified by (B) or (C) of this section. 
Another situation justifying the use of deadly 
physical force by a peace officer involves the armed fleeing 
criminal. Under paragraph (B) a peace officer may use deadly 
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physical force to effect the arrest of a person who is 
fleeing while in possession of a deadly weapon on or about 
his person. Insofar as this paragraph allows a peace officer 
to use deadly physical force against a non-felon escapee who 
is not necessarily using his weapon, it expands existing law. 
However, the Subcornmission concluded that the factors of 
flight plus possession of a deadly weapon should be sufficient 
evidence of dangerousness to justify the use of deadly force 
if necessary to effect an arrest. 
Paragraph (C) recognizes that a peace officer may 
use deadly physical force to effect an arrest or prevent an 
escape of a person who " may otherwise endanger life or inflict 
serious physical injury unless arrested without delay. " This 
section gives the police necessary leeway to deal with a 
person who may not have committed a forceful felony, and who is 
not in possession of a deadly weapon but is nevertheless highly 
dangerous. 
Paragraph (C) specifically provides that the use of 
physical force by a peace officer is not justifiable unless 
the officer reasonably believes the arrest to be lawful. 
VI. TD AS 11. 21. 180. JUSTIFICATION: USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE 
BY PRIVATE PERSON ASSISTING AN ARREST OR PREVENTING ESCAPE 
Existing law, AS 12. 25. 090,recognizes that "a peace 
officer making an arrest may orally summon as many persons as 
he considers necessary to aid him in making the arrest. " 
TD AS 11. 21. 180 protects the citizen who is ordered by a peace 
officer to assist in making an arrest pursuant to this statute. 
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As with other sections of this chapter, this statute 
allows a person to act on appearances provided he does so 
reasonably. Thus, a citizen who has been called upon by a 
person he reasonably believes to be a peace officer to make 
an arrest is justified in using non-deadly physical force 
" when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it to be 
necessary to carry out the peace officer's direction. " 
Pursuant to subsection (b) a citizen may use deadly 
physical force to assist a peace officer only when such force 
is authorized by other sections of chapter 21, or when he is 
directed or authorized by the officer to use such force unless 
he knows that the officer lacks the authority to employ such 
force under the circumstances. 
VII. TD AS 11. 21. 190. JUSTIFICATION: USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE 
BY PRIVATE PERSON IN MAKING AN ARREST OR PREVENTING AN ESCAPE 
Ordinarily, a private person is not expected or 
encouraged to make arrests on his own account because he has 
not been trained in the restrained use of force or to appre­
ciate such factors as probable cause and the possibility of 
mistake. Therefore, the rules in the Revised Code governing 
the use of physical force by private persons making arrests 
on their own account are generally more stringent than those 
controlling peace officers as well as persons assisting 
peace officers. 
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Existing AS 11. 25. 010 and . 030 recognize that a 
private person has the same arrest powers as a peace officer, 
and consequently a homicide is justifiable if committed by a 
private person in the attempt to arrest a fleeing felon. 
AS 11. 15. lOO (c) . However, while AS 12. 25. 080 recognizes that 
a peace officer may ''use all the necessary and proper means to 
effect the arrest" , the statute does not refer to the private 
citizen. Whether this statute limits the amount of force 
which can be used by the private citizen acting on his own 
account is not clear. 
The Revised Code changes existing law by providing 
that in certain situations the use of physical force by a 
private citizen acting on his own in making an arrest or in 
preventing an escape from custody is more limited than the 
power granted to a peace officer. 
TD AS ll. 21. 190(a) provides that the use of phys­
ical force in effecting an arrest or preventing an escape 
from custody is justified only when the citizen reasonably 
believes a crime has been committed in his presence. The 
Subcommission recognizes that as a consequence of this change, 
AS 12. 24. 030, Grounds for Arrest by Private Person . . .  
Without Warrant, will require amendment. 
However, insofar as existing law imposes strict 
liability on the citizen's assessment of the right to use 
deadly force, (under AS 11.15. 100, homicide is justifiable 
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only if the person arrested has in fact committed a felony) , 
the Revised Code provides greater protection to the citizen 
acting on his own account. As one commentator has noted, the 
strict liability approach is subj ect to criticism. 
The imposition of strict liability . . .  suggests 
that the conduct in question is to be approved only 
in the most extreme circumstances; it marks a funda­
mental departure from the premise that if conduct is 
justifiable, one should be able to engage in it 
according to the same standards of perception that 
customaril y guide his behavior in activities for 
which he claims no defense. The resul t  of this rule 
is to place enormous risks on public-spirited 
citizens. If a legislative decision is made 
approving citizen's arrests, it would be fairer 
to the citizen to restrict the crimes to which 
it applies, rather than undermine the privilege 
itself by making it extremely difficul t  to assert. 
Justification Defenses, 75 COLUM. L ,  REV . 914, 948. 
Consistent with the other provisions in chapter 21, 
TD AS ll. 21. 190(a) provides that a citizen who acts upon a 
reasonable belief that a crime has been committed in his 
presence will be j ustified in his use of force even though 
his belief may have been mistaken. 
Subsection (b) provides that a citizen acting on 
his own account may use deadly physical force when he 
reasonably believes the suspect has committed in his presence 
murder, manslaughter, robbery or forcible sexual assault. 
The citizen may also use deadly physical force to 
arrest a person who is in immediate flight after commission 
of one of these crimes. In this limited situation, there is 
no requirement that the offense be committed in the citizen ' s  
presence, but the crime must in fact have been committed. 
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VIII. TD AS 11. 21. 200. JUS TIFICAT ION: USE OF PHYSICAL 
FORCE IN RESISTING ARREST 
In Miller v. State, 462 P. 2d 421 (1969) and Gray v. 
State, supra, the Alaska Supreme Court adopted the rule 
proposed to be codified in TD AS 11. 21. 100. 
In Miller, at p. 427 the Co urt held as follows: 
[ A] private citizen may not use force to resist 
peaceful arrest by one he knows or has good reason 
to believe is an authorized peace officer performing 
his duties, regardless of whether the arrest is 
illegal in the circumstances of the occasion. It 
should be noted that the rule we formulate today has 
no application when the arrestee apprehends bodily 
inj ury, or when an unlawful arrest is attempted by 
one not known to be a peace officer. Quite different 
problems are then presented. 
In Gray, at 908 the Court specifically considered 
the issue of an officer's unprivileged use of force in making 
an arrest: 
[A] n officer in making an arrest is privileged by 
statute to use only that force which is necessary 
to restrain the arrested person. To the use of 
necessary force the arrested person cannot claim 
the privilege of self-defense. If more than 
necessary force is used, then the officer commits 
an unprivileged use of force, the arrested person 
must have the right to use reasonable force to 
defend himself. 
IX. TD AS 11. 21. 210. USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE TO PREVENT 
ESCAPE FROM CORRECTIONAL FACILITY 
Under existing law, a guard in a correctional facility 
may use o nly the same amount of physical force in preventing 
an escape from a correctional facility as could have been used 
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in making the original arrest. AS 11. 15. 0 90 (3) ; 12. 25. 120 ; 
12. 25. 130 . As deadly physical force may not be used under 
existing law to arrest a misdemeanant, such force cannot now be 
used to prevent his escape. 
By restricting the use of deadly physical force to 
preventing escapes by felons, existing law may discourage 
guards from using the degree of force necessary to prevent 
an escape, thereby increasing the chances of a successful 
escape. Since in many instances a guard will have no way 
of knowing whether the escapee is a misdemeanant or felon, 
a rule which depends upon that distinction will force the 
guard into a guessing game and may result in a failure to 
use deadly force when it would be necessary to prevent the 
escape .  In the long run, a rule which clearly authoriz es 
the use of deadly force when necessary to prevent an escape, 
which is understood by guard and prisoner alike, will 
lead to fewer attempted escapes and reduce the number 
of incidents where deadly force is used. 
Because the danger to society resulting from an 
escape from a correctional facility is greater than the 
danger posed by the defeat of an arrest on the street, the 
Revised Code specifically permits a guard or peace officer 
employed in a correctional facility to '' use physical force 
when and to the extent he reasonably believes it necessary 
to prevent the escape of a prisoner from a correctional 
facility. " 
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X. TD AS 11. 21. 100. JUSTIFICATION: BURDEN OF INJECTING 
THE ISSUE 
The section places the burden of injecting the 
issue of a defense of justification on the defendant but 
leaves the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt 
on the state. This means that if there is no evidence to 
indicate that the defendant's acts were justified, the 
defendant has not succeeded in "inj ecting the issue '  and 
the Court will not inform the jury of the existence of the 
defense. If there is some evidence of justification, the 
defendant will be convicted only if the state proves beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the criminal act was not justified. 
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CHAPTER 3 1 .  ATTEMPT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
Attempt 
Solicitation 
Conspiracy [ Reserved] 
Defenses to Solicitation and Conspiracy [ Reserved] 
Multipl e  Conviction Barred. [ Reserved] 
Sec. 11 . 3 1. 100. ATTEMPT. (a) A person commits the crime of 
attempt when , with intent to corrnnit a crime, he engages in conduct which 
constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the crime. 
(b) In a prosecution under (a) of this section , it is not a defens 
that it was factually or legally impossible to commit the crime which 
was the obj ect o f  the attempt when the conduct engaged in by the defen­
dant would be a crime had the attendant circumstances been as he be­
lieved them to be. 
(c) In a prosecution under (a) of this section , it is an affirma­
tive defense that the defendant, under circumstances manifesting a 
voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal intent , prevented 
the commission of the attempted crime by abandoning his criminal effort 
and, if the mere abandonment is insufficient to accomplish this avoid­
ance, doing everything necessary to prevent the cormnission of the 
attempted crime and in fact the att empted crime is prevented. 
(d) An attempt is a 
(1) class A felony if the offense attempted is murder ; 
(2) class B fe lony if the offense attempted is a class A 
felony ; 
( 3) class C felony if the offense attempted is a class B 
fe lony ; 
(4) class A misdemeanor if the offense attempted is a class 
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C felony ; 
( 5 )  class B misdemeanor if the offense attempted is a class 
A or class B misdemeanor . 
Sec. 11. 31.110. SOLICITATION. (a) A person commits the crime of 
solicitation if, with the intent of causing another to engage in specifi 
conduct constituting a crime, he commands or solicits the other person 
to engage in that conduct. 
(b) In a prosecution under (a) of this section it is an affirmativ 
defense that the defendant under circumstances manifesting a voluntary 
and compl ete renunciation of his criminal intent, after soliciting or 
commanding another person to commit a crime , persuaded the person soli­
cited or commanded not to commit the crime or otherwise prevented the 
commission of the crime . 
(c) Sol icitation is a 
(1) class A felony if the offense solicited is murder ; 
(2) class B felony if the offense solicited is a class A 
felony ; 
(3) class C felony if the offense sol icited i s  a class B 
felony ; 
(4) class A misdemeanor if the offense solicited is a class 
C felony ; 
(5) class B misdemeanor if the offense solicited is a class 
A or class B misdemeanor. 
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ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 31 - ATTEMPT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
COMMENTARY 
The Effect of the Revised Code on the Existing Law of 
Attempt and Related Offenses 
1. Codifies existing case law making intent to 
commit a crime an essential element of the crime 
of attempt. 
2. Codifies the widely recognized doctrine that 
mere preparation to commit a crime does not 
constitute an attempt. 
3 .  Eliminates the present limitation that a person 
cannot be convicted of attempt unless it is 
proven that the attempt failed. 
4. Eliminates factual and legal impossibility 
as a defense to attempt. 
5. Provides that a "voluntary and complete" abandon­
ment of criminal effort which succeeds in preventing 
the crime is an affirmative defense to attempt 
and solicitation. 
I. TD AS 11. 3 1. 100 - ATTEMPT 
A. Culpable Mental State Required 
Consistent with existing law, the Revised Code 
provides that a defendant must act "with intent to commit 
a crime" to be guilty of attempt. While the present 
statute, AS 11. 05. 020, does not explicitly refer to the 
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element of intent, the Alaska Supreme Court has held that 
a defendant is guilty of attempted larceny only if he had 
the "intent to commit the crime of larceny", Gargan v. State, 
436 P. 2d 968 ( AK 1968). Further, the Oregon Supreme Court 
interpreted a statute similar to the present Alaska attempt 
provision to require an intent to commit the attempted crime. 
State v. Duffy, 295 P 953 (Ore . 1931). 
B. Act Required 
The Revised Code also deals with the problem of 
distinguishing acts of preparation from an attempt. The 
existing attempt statute requires the prosecution to prove 
only " any act towards the commission of the crime. " AS 11. 05. 020. 
However, this has been interpreted as excluding merely pre­
paratory conduct. 
In Gargan, supra, the court cited Lemke v. United 
States , 211 F. 2d 73 (9th Cir. 195 4) for the basic proposi-
tion that " mere praparation to commit a crime, not followed 
by an overt act done towards its commission, does not 
constitute an attempt. " In Gargan, the defendant was caught 
unscrewing the lock on a coin box attached to a washing 
machine and convicted of attempted larceny in a building. 
The Supreme Court held that the evidence presented a jury 
question of whether the defendant "had committed an unequivocal 
overt act towards the commission of the crime. " Gargan, 
supra, at 971. 
The Revised Code requires that the defendant's 
conduct be a "substantial step" towards the commission of 
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the crime to constitute an attempt to commit that crime. 
The Subcommission recognized, consistent with the approach 
taken by the Oregon Code, that specificity beyond this point 
would be self-defeating. However, the commentary to the 
Oregon Attempt statute notes and approves the Model Penal 
Code's partial explanation of what is mean by a " substantial 
step". 
In § 5. 01(2) the Model Penal Code states that 
to be a substantial step the act must be "strongly 
corroborative of the actor ' s  criminal purpose". The 
MPC then proceeds to list the kinds of acts which 
could be held to be substantial in light of the 
"strongly corroborative" provision. The Commission 
believes that the listing of these acts more properly 
belongs in the section comments as a matter of 
legislative history. In keeping with this view the 
Model Penal Code examples of acts which should not 
be held insufficient as a matter of law to constitute 
a substantial step are approved and are set out as 
follows: 
(a) lying in wait, searching for or following 
the contemplated victim of the crime; 
(b) enticing or seeking to entice the con­
templated victim of the crime to go to the place 
contemplated for its commission; 
(c) reconnoitering the place contemplated for 
the commission of the crime; 
(d) unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle or 
enclosure in which it is contemplated that the crime 
will be committed; 
(e) possession of materials to be employed 
in the commission of the crime, which are specially 
designed for such unlawful use or which can serve 
no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances; 
(f) possession, collection or fabrication of 
materials to be employed in the commission of the 
crime, at or near the place contemplated for its 
commission, where such possession, collection or 
fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor 
under the circumstances; 
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(g) soliciting an innocent agent to engage in 
conduct constituting an element of the crime. 
ORS 161. 405, Commentary at 49-50. 
C. Elimination of Requirement that Attempt Fail 
The Revised Code does not require that the target 
offense of the attempt fail as a prerequisite to conviction 
for attempt. The requirement of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that an attempt was unsuccessful places an unnecessary 
and unj ustifiable burden upon the prosecution. 
Under existing law, the prosecution is faced with 
a real dilemma when it brings a prosecution for a crime which 
may or may not have been completed, but for which there is 
no doubt that " a  substantial step" sufficient to support an 
attempt conviction has occurred. The Subcornmission discussed 
the example of rape, where there often is a reasonable doubt 
over whether penetration occurred. Under these circumstances 
the prosecution should be allowed to prosecute for the crime 
of attempted rape without being required to show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that there was no penetration, and hence no 
completed crime. 
D.  Subsection (b) - Impossibility - No Defense to Attempt 
Subsection (b) provides that neither legal or factual 
impossibility is a defense to attempt. 
" Impossibility" is said to be of two kinds;  factual 
and legal. The classic example of factual impossibility is 
an attempt to pick an empty pocket. In Gargan, supra, the 
Alaska Supreme Court recognized that such conduct would 
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constitute attempted larceny and adopted the so-called 
"empty pocket doctrine". However, the court's holding was 
limited to "factual impossibility". 
In a number of jurisdictions, "legal impossibility" 
is recognized as a defense to a charge of attempt. For example, 
the defense of " legal impossibility" provides that a person who 
receives goods which h e  believes to have been stolen, but 
which were not then stolen, is not guilty of an attempt to 
receive stolen goods. 
The rationale in favor of recognizing legal 
impossibility as a defense to attempt is that, j udging 
the defendant's conduct in the light of the actual facts, 
what he intended to do did not amount to a crime. However, 
the Subcommission rejected this approach as it exonerates 
defendants in situations where attempt liability should be 
imposed. In all cases of legal impossibility (1) criminal 
purpose has been clearly demonstrated, (2) the defendant 
has gone as far as he could in implementing that purpose, 
and (3) as a result, the defendant's dangerousness is 
plainly manifested. Therefore, the Revised Code explicitly 
excludes legal as well as factual impossibility as a defense 
to attempt. 
E. Subsection (c) - Renunciation as a Defense to 
Attempt 
Subsection (c) provides that a "voluntary and 
complete" abandonment of criminal effort which succeeds 
in preventing a crime is a defense to a prosecution for 
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attempt . There is currently no statute or reported cases 
on this subj ect in Alaska. 
The defense of abandonment of criminal effort, or 
"renunciation" ,  is an affirmative defense - the defendant 
must prove all the elements of the defense by a preponderance 
of the evidence. 
The first element of the defense, and probably the 
most difficult to prove, is that the renunciation must be 
'' voluntary and complete" . TD AS 11. 3 1. 150 , (inadvertently 
ommitted in this Draft from Chapter 31) , provides a strict standard: 
a renunciation is not '' voluntary and complete" 
if it is motivated in whole or in part by 
(1) a belief that circumstances exist 
whic h increase the probability of detection 
or apprehension of the defendant or another 
participant in the criminal enterprise, or 
which render more difficult the accomplishment 
of the criminal purpose; or 
(2) a decision to postpone the criminal 
conduct until another time or to transfer the 
criminal effort to another victim or another 
but similar objective. 
The second element of the defense is that the 
defendant must actuall y  prevent the crime. In pursuit of that 
goal, the defendant must abandon his criminal effort. If 
the mere abandonment is insufficient by itself to prevent 
the crime, the defendant must do whatever is necessary to 
prevent the crime. Of course, if the defendant's "substantial 
step" toward the commission of the crime is itself a crime, he 
would be guilty of that crime (e. g. , possession of explosives), 
but not of an attempt to commit the crime (e. g. , arson). 
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In explicitly recognizing this defense, the Sub­
commission concluded that a voluntary and complete renunciation 
of attempt negatives the inference of dangerousness which 
justifies punishing attempt in the first place. 
F. Subsection (d) - Punishment of Attempt 
With two exceptions, subsection (d) grades attempt 
at one level below that for the substantive crime, e. g. , an 
attempt to commit a class A felony will be a class B felony. 
However, attempted murder, an unclassified crime, is classified 
as a class A felony while an attempt to commit a B misdemeanor 
is classified as a B misdemeanor. 
II. TD AS 11. 31. 110 - SOLICITATION 
Existing law, AS 11. 10. 07 0, provides that the crime 
of Inciting Commission of a Crime is committed by one who 
'' wilfully and knowingly solicits, incites or induces" another 
to commit a crime. If the offense solicited is a felony, the 
maximum punishment is three years. 
the maximum penalty is six months. 
If a misdemeanor is solicited, 
The Solicitation statute of the Revised Code, 
TD AS 11. 31. 110, provides that the defendant must act "with the 
intent of causing another to engage in conduct constituting a 
crime". This culpable mental state requirement is essentially 
the same as that required for attempt. 
Under the Revised Code, solicitation is not limited 
to attempts to serve as the initial instigator of criminal 
conduct; it also encompasses a defendant who seeks to encourage 
further one already considering the possibility of committing 
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a crime [ See generally l Wharton Criminal Law§ 81 ( Anderson 
Ed. 1957 ) ] .  The defendant must, however, do more than merely 
express approval of plans to engage in illegal activities. 
He  must affirmatively promote the commission of the illegal 
act. 
I t  is believed that the definition of the acts 
necessary for the crime, the actus reus, should be narrowly 
drawn to prevent the imposition of liability based on casual 
remarks. Consequently, the term "solicits" was used in the 
provision because it is an historic legal term that carries 
with it established limitations. The term " commands" has been 
added because technically it might not fall within the dictionary 
meaning of solicitation, i. e. , entreating, importuning, etc. , 
yet it certainly involves the same form of affirmative promotion. 
Subsection (a) requires that the actor solicit 
specific conduct. This limitation is designed to eliminate 
the potential for solicitation prosecution in cases involving, 
for example, political agitation. A general exhortation to 
" go out and revolt"  does not consitute solicitation, although 
it may in particular circumstances constitute incitement to 
riot . 
In its usual case, criminal solicitation will 
involve the solicitation of another to engage in conduct 
constituting a complete crime. The Revised Code, of course, 
covers this, but it also covers the unusual situation where 
the solicitor actually solicits an attempted crime. This 
would occur in the case where the crime contemplated could 
78 . 
not be completed because of "legal impossibility. " 
A person should not escape liability for soliciting 
a crime simply because, for example, the pocket he wished 
another to pick is empty. 
Subsection (b) provides for the affirmative defense 
of "renunciation" similar to that provided for attempt. The 
person who has solicited a crime must actually prevent the 
crime under circumstances manifesting a "complete and voluntary 
renunciation of his criminal intent. " See §I E, supra. 
Subsection (c) provides punishment for solicitation 
on the same level as attempts. While existing law punishes 
solicitation less severely than attempt, the Revised Code 
reflects the judgment that solicitation often presents as 
much danger as an attempt and should be placed in the same 
general category. 
7 9 . 
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ARTICLE 5. ROBBERY. 
SECTION 
500 Robbery in the first degree 
510  Robbery in the second degree 
WU!il\ LJ.liAl''T l;UJ:' l 
Sec. 11 . 41 . 5 00. ROBBERY IN THE FIRST DEGREE . (a) A person 
connnits the crime of robbery in the first degree if he violates sec. 510  
of this chapter and in the course of connnitting the acts specified in 
sec. 510 of this chapter, or in immediate flight after an attempt or 
connni s s ion , either the defendant or another participant 
(1) is armed with a deadly weapon or represents by word or 
conduct that he or another participant is so armed ; 
(2) uses or attempts to use a dangerous instrument or repre­
sents by word or conduct that he or another participant is armed with 
a dangerous instrument ; or 
(3)  causes or attempts to cause serious physical injury 
to any person .  
(b) Robbery in the first degree is a class A felony. 
Sec. 11. 41. 510. ROBBERY IN THE SECOND DEGREE. (a) A person 
commits the crime of robbery in the second degree if, in the course of 
taking or attempting to take property from the person or the immediate 
presence and control of a person, he uses or threatens the immediate 
use o f  phys ical force upon another person with the intent of 
(1) preventing or overcoming res istance to his taking of the 
property or to his retention of the property after taking ; or 
(2) compelling the other person to deliver the property or to 
engage in other conduct which might aid in the taking of the property. 
(b) Robbery in the second degree is a class B felony . 
8 0  
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
Chapter 21 - Offenses Against the Person 
ARTICLE 5. ROBBERY 
COMMENTARY 
The Effect of the Revised Code on the Existing Law of Robbery 
1. Eliminates the existing limitation that robbery 
does not occur unless property is actually taken 
from the victim. 
2. Consolidates the existing crimes of Robbery, Assault 
with Intent to Rob and Use of Firearms during a 
Robbery. 
TD AS 11.41.500; 510 - ROBBERY IN THE FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE 
This article provides for two ascending degrees of 
robbery. TD AS 11.41.510, Second Degree Robbery, contains 
the basic statement of the crime, with TD AS 11.41.500 
providing that certain aggravating factors will raise the crime 
to Robbery in the First Degree. 
The Revised Code does not require, for either 
degree of robbery, that property actually be taken from the 
victim. Under existing law, robbery is only committed if 
the robber "steals or takes anything of value'', AS 15.15.240. 
If the would-be robber fails to acquire any property, he is 
guilty of Assault with Intent to Commit Robbery, AS 11.15.160, 
or simply Attempted Robbery. This approach emphasizes the 
property aspects of the crime and treats it as an aggravated 
form of theft. If, however, the primary concern is with 
the physical danger to the victim and his difficulty in 
81. 
protecting himself from sudden attacks against his person, 
then the actual taking of property becomes less important. 
The Revised Code emphasizes the person, rather than the 
property, aspects of the offense. 
Under the Revised Code, a person commits Robbery 
in the Second Degree if "in the course of taking or attempting 
to take property from the person or the immediate presence 
and control of a person he uses or threatens the immediate 
use of physical force upon another person with intent of 
either (a) preventing or overcoming resistance to his taking 
of the property or his retention immediately after taking or 
(b) compelling the other person to deliver the property to 
engage in other conduct which might aid in the commission 
of theft." This statute will normally be used to prosecute 
the unarmed type of robbery. By requiring a threat of 
"immediate use" of physical force, this section is distinguish­
able from Theft by Extortion, TD AS 11.46.100. 
TD AS 11.41.500 raises the crime to Robbery in 
the First Degree if at least one of several aggravating 
factors is present. First, a defendant commits first degree 
robbery if he is armed with a deadly weapon, regardless of 
whether the victim is aware that the defendant is so armed. 
This aggravating factor parallels the existing statute which 
provides harsher penalties for "carrying" a firearm during a 
robbery, AS 11.15.295. In effect, it is presumed that the 
robber would not have been carrying the weapon unless he was 
willing to use it. 
82. 
Second, the robbery becomes first degree if 
the robber represents by word or conduct that he or another 
participant is armed with a deadly weapon or dangerous 
instrument, even if nobody is so armed. This aggravating 
factor is present when a robber uses a note, a fake 
weapon or a "hand in pocket'' technique to convey the 
impression that he is armed. The justification for this 
factor is the additional terror instilled in the victim 
by the threat inherent in the apparent presence of a weapon. 
Furthermore, that additional terror could lead to a more 
violent response or attempted response to the robber's 
threat by the victim or another, thereby endangering everyone 
in the vicinity. 
Third, the robbery is elevated to first degree 
if the robber uses or attempts to use a dangerous instrument, 
or causes or attempts to cause serious physical injury. 
This aggravating factor serves somewhat the same function as the 
present AS 11.15.160, Assault with Intent to Commit Robbery, 
which currently carries the same penalty as Robbery. 
First Degree Robbery is committed when any of 
the three aggravating factors occur in the course of taking 
or attempting to take property or in immediate flight after 
an attempt or taking. The defendant's willingness to use force 
against those who would restrain him in flight strongly 
suggests t)lat he would have employed it to effect the taking 
of property. 
83. 
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CHAPTER 56. OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
ARTICLE 
1 Bribery and Related Offenses 
2 Perjury and �elated Offenses 
ARTIC�E 1. BRIBERY AND RELATED OFFENSES 
SECTION 
100 
llO 
120 
Bribery 
Receiving a Bribe 
Receiving Unlawful Gratuities 
Sec. 11.56.100. BRIBERY. (a) A person commits the crime of 
bribery if he offers, confers, or agrees to confer a benefit upon a 
public servant with the intent to influence the public servant's vote, 
opinion, judgment, action, decision or exercise of discretion in his 
official capacity. 
(b) In a prosecution under (a) of this section it is not a defense 
that the person sought to be influenced was not qualified to act in the 
desired way, whether because he had not assumed office, lacked juris-· 
diction or for any other reason. 
(c) Bribery is a class B felony. 
Sec. 11.56.110. RECEIVING A BRIBE. 
the crime of receiving a bribe if he 
(a) A public servant commits 
(1) solicits a benefit with the intent that his vote, opinion, 
judgment, action, decision or exercise of discretion as a public servant 
will be influenced; or 
(2) accepts or agrees to accept a benefit upon an agreement 
or understanding that his vote, opinion, judgment, action, decision or 
exercise of discretion as a public servant will be influenced. 
(b) Receiving a bribe is a class B felony. 
Sec. ll. 56 .120. RECEIVING UNLA\.-JFUL GRATUITIES. (a) A 
84. 
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public servant commits the crime of receiving unlawful gratuities when 
he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept a benefit for having engaged in 
an official act which he was required or authorized to perform, and for 
which he was not entitled to any special or additional compensation. 
(b) Receiving unlawful gratuities is a class A misdemeanor. 
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
Chapter 56 - Offenses Against Public Administration 
ARTICLE 1. BRIBERY AND RELATED OFFENSES 
COMMENTARY 
The Effect of the Revised Code Provision on the Existing 
Law of Bribery and Related Offenses: 
1. Clearly defines who may be bribed and with what. 
By using one definition of "public servant", the 
reader of the bribery statute is spared the 
presently required task of consulting 10 
provisions, 7 of them outside the existing 
Criminal Code, to determine who may be bribed. 
2. Specifically recognizes that it is not a defense 
to bribery that the public servant could not in 
fact take the action desired by the person confer­
ring the benefit. 
3. Eliminates the adjective "corruptly" from the 
existing bribery statutes to prohibit without 
qualification the giving or receiving of any 
benefit with intent to affect official decision 
making. 
4. Specifically provides that the solicitation of a 
bribe by a public servant constitutes the crime 
of bribe receiving. 
86. 
SECTION ANALYSIS OF REVISED CODE 
GENERAL DEFINITIONS OF "BENEFIT" AND "PUBLIC SERVANT" 
Key to an understanding of the Bribery provisions 
of the Revised Code are the definitions of two terms defined 
in Chapter 6 - "Benefit" and "Public Servant ". 
"Benefit" means a present or future gain 
or advantage to the beneficiary or to a third 
person pursuant to the desire or consent of the 
beneficiary, but does not include political 
campaign contributions reported in accordance 
with the requirements of AS 15.13. 
"Public Servant" means each of the following, 
whether compensated or not, but does not include 
jurors or witnesses: 
(A) an officer or employee of the state, 
a political subdivision of the state, or govern­
mental instrumentality of the state, including, 
but not limited to, legislators, members of the 
judiciary and peace officers; 
(B) a person who participates as an advisor, 
consultant or assistant at the request or direction 
of the state, a political subdivision, or govern­
mental instrumentality; 
(C) a person who serves as a member of a 
board or commission created by statute or by 
legislative, judicial, or administrative action 
by the state, a political subdivision, or govern­
mental instrumentality; 
(D) a person nominated, elected, appointed, 
employed, or designated to act in a capacity 
defined in (A) - (C) of this paragraph, but who 
does not occupy the position. 
A. Benefit 
Current law defines the consideration sufficient 
to constitute a bribe to include not only a "gift, gratuity, 
valuable consideration" but also any "other thing", AS 11.30. 040. 
The Revised Code uses the term "benefit" to describe this 
consideration. 
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t•7hen first considered by the Subcommission, the 
term "benefit" was qualified by the word "pecuniary". The 
original definition of "pecuniary benefit'' required that 
the benefit have a primary significance of economic gain. 
The Subcommission concluded that this definition was 
unduly restrictive since it could be argued that the 
primary significance of, for example, a plane ticket to 
Hawaii was not "economic gain" but rather spiritual 
well-being. 
In substituting the term "benefit" for the more 
restrictive term "pecuniary benefit" the Subcommission 
intended to insure coverage in all appropriate cases. 
However, the Subcommission was in agreement with 
the observation made in the Commentary to the Oregon 
Revised Code that by themselves "[g]ratuities of an insigni­
ficant value, in the form of a social amenity or holiday 
gift, are ... beyond the scope of the bribery sections .... " 
ORS §162.005, Commentary at 81. 
Further, "benefits" which serve only to provide 
a "climate for discussion" with a public servant (i.e., 
picking up a dinner tab or a golfing fee) are also beyond 
the scope of the proposed bribery statutes because the 
granting of the "benefit" is not in itself intended or 
expected to influence an official decision. Such minor 
"gifts", not apparently related to the performance of a 
service, and "climate for discussion" benefits, though 
8 8. 
outside the criminal code, are highly appropriate topics 
to be covered in conflict of interest statutes and ethical 
conduct regulations and standards. 
Insofar as they are reported in accordance with 
AS 15. 13 (State Election Campaigns) , political campaign 
contributions have been specifically excluded from the 
scope of "benefit". This qualification is intended to make 
it clear that legitimate, reported political campaign contri­
butions, though made with an intent to advance a political 
viewpoint, are not to be punished as bribery. 
B. Public Servant 
1. Existing Law 
Currently, AS 11. 30. 040 provides that bribery 
can be committed only in relation to a "peace officer, 
judicial officer, executive officer or public official". 
Separate statutes, many of them outside of Title 11, must 
be consulted in order to understand the meaning of those 
four terms. 
The definition of "peace officer " is found in the 
general definitions section of Title 1, AS 01. 10. 060 as 
any officer of the State Troopers, members of 
the police force of any incorporated city or 
borough, U. S. Marshals and their deputies, 
and other officers whose duty is to enforce 
and preserve the public peace . ... 
"Judicial officer" is defined for purposes of 
the bribery sections in AS 11. 30.060 as a person 
(1) authorized to act as a judge in a court; 
89. 
(2) summoned as a juror in a court, in 
an inquest, or before any officer, from the 
time he is summoned; or 
(3) who is a referee, umpire, or 
arbitrator, from the time of his appointment. 
The definition of "executive officer" appears 
in AS 11.30.070 and includes all officers 
of the state ... borough, town, or other 
municipal or public corporation not included 
in the definition of judicial officers ... 
from the time of his election or appointment .... 
To determine who is a "public official", the 
reader must consult AS 11.30.075, which in turn refers him 
to "the definitions appearing in AS 39.50.200 (1) , as 
supplemented by AS 39.50.200(e) ". 
Following instructions, the reader finds among the 
statutes on conflict of interest the following definition: 
"public official" means a judicial officer, 
a member of the legislature, the governor, the 
lieutenant governor, a person hired or appointed 
as the head or deputy head of, or director of 
a division within, a department in the executive 
branch, an assistant to the governor, chairman 
or member of a state commission or board, and 
each appointed or elected municipal officer .... 
As promised by the statute which referred the reader to 
Title 39 in the first place, this definition is explained 
by an additional definition in AS 39.50.090 (e) : 
"public official " includes ... chairmen and 
members of all commissions and boards created 
by statute or administrative action as agencies 
of the state. 
Both of these definitions use the term "state commission 
or board", which is defined in turn by AS 39.50.200 (9) : 
"state commission or board" means the ... [there then 
appears a list of 38 commissions or boards, which 
presumably should be amended every time a new 
board or commission is created.] 
Furthermore, the original definition of "public official" 
in AS 39. 50. 200(1) uses the terms "judicial officer" , 
" municipal officer" and "assistant to the governor" which 
are defined in AS 39 50. 200(2) , (6) and (10) , respectively. 
"[J]udicial officer" means a person appointed as 
a justice to the supreme court or as a judge 
to the superior court, district court or magistrate 
court; 
"municipal officer" includes a borough or city 
mayor, borough assemblyman, city councilman, 
school board member, elected utility planning 
or zoning commission within a home rule or 
general law city or borough, including but not 
limited to a unified municipality under 
AS 29.68; 
"assistant to the governor" includes any 
executive, legislative, special, administrative 
or press assistant to the governor, and any 
person similarly employed .... 
The reader will be spared the listing of further definitions 
of the terms appearing in the definition of " municipal 
officer" . 
Clearly, the existing approach to defining 
who may be bribed is unnecessarily confusing, and in fact 
leaves loopholes. For example, in AS 39.50.200 (a) ,the 
Criminal Code Revision Subcommission is not included among 
the 38 other boards and commissions whose members are con­
sidered "public officials". Consequently, a person could 
not be prosecuted under existing law for bribing a member 
of the Criminal Code Revision Subcommission with intent to 
influence his decision on the definition of "public 
servant" appearing in this report. 
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2. The Code Provision 
The problems with the existing definition of 
"public official" are resolved in the Revised Code by the 
use of the comprehensive term, " public servant". This 
term is defined broadly to include not only every category 
of government or public officer, but every employee of 
every such office or agency, every person retained to 
perform some government service and every person who, 
though not having yet assumed his official duties, "has 
been nominated, elected, appointed, employed or designated 
to become a public servant". As so defined, the blanket 
term, "public servant", permits the formulation of relatively 
few statutes in this area to replace many existing sections 
and also produces considerable language simplification 
within each statute. 
The definition of "public servant" has been 
drafted to make it clear that those serving "political sub­
divisions" and "governmental instrumentalities" within the 
state are included. Coverage is also intended to reach 
persons who serve governmental instrumentalities, political 
subdivisions or the state in advisory or consultative 
capacities. 
The words "whether compensated or not" have been 
added to insure that the bribery statutes cover individuals 
who are serving in a compensatory position as well as those 
serving without pay. The gist of the offense is the intent 
to influence the course of public administration. The 
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public servant functioning gratuitously may often be 
as effective in corrupting governmental process as the 
paid functionary. 
Consistent with existing law, subsection (c) 
insures that the bribery statute cover those individuals 
who serve on the many state and local boards and commissions. 
I. TD AS 11.56.100, 110 - BRIBERY; RECEIVING A BRIBE 
The gist of the crime of bribery is an effort 
to secure an improper advantage in the judicial, adminis­
trative or legislative decision-making process. 
The proposed sections make only minor changes in 
existing law. Bribe Receiving has been broadened to include 
solicitation of bribes by public servant�, �vhich is not 
prohibited by the existing statute. 
The bribery statutes eliminate the use of the 
word ' corruptly" and prohibit without qualification the 
giving or receiving of any benefit to influence official 
decision-making. 
Consistent with existing law, TD AS 11.56.100 
penalizes offers made with the intent to influence a public 
servant. No meeting of the minds is required before the 
offerer of a bribe may be prosecuted. The recipient, 
however, must have either solicited the bribe or have 
accepted it upon an agreement or understanding with the 
offerer before he has committed bribe receiving. 
TD AS 11.56.l00 (b) is a further application of 
the doctrine of impossibility which is discussed in Article 31. 
93. 
The Subcommission considered and rejected the 
following defense to bribery: 
In a prosecution [for bribery] it is a defense 
that the defendant offered, conferred or agreed 
to confer the benefit as a result of the public 
servant's conduct constituting extortion or 
coercion. 
The Subcommission rejected this provision 
because it was felt to reward wrong-doing. However, such 
pressure would be a relevant consideration in the 
determination of the penalty upon conviction. Similarly, 
cooperation in reporting a bribe would be a valid consideration 
in the state's decision whether or not to prosecute. 
II. TD AS 11.56.120 - RECEIVING UNLAWFUL GRATUITIES 
TD AS 11.56.120 is derived from existing AS 11.30.230 (1) 
without major substantive changes. 
The bribery statute, TD AS 11. 56.100 covers all 
cases of reward for improper conduct on the part of a public 
servant. Receiving Unlawful Gratuities, TD AS 11.56.120 
covers all cases of improper reward for conduct which the 
public servant was required or authorized to perform. 
The need for TD AS 1 1.56. 120 is apparent. "Tipping" 
a public servant undermines the integrity of governmental 
administration, especially if the public servant directly 
or indirectly solicits the "tip''. The giver of unlawful 
gratuities to a public servant puts all citizens who have 
such an official under pressure to "tip" or risk his 
disfavor. This statute will also provide a public servant 
with a graceful but effective way of refusing tips. 
94. 
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SECTION 
200 
210 
220 
230 
240 
ARTICLE 2. PERJURY AND RELATED OFFENSES 
Perjury 
Unsworn Falsification 
Proof of Guilt 
Perjury by Inconsistent Statements 
Definitions 
Sec. 11.56.200. PERJURY. (a) A person commits the crime of 
perjury if he makes a false sworn statement, which he does not believe 
to be true. 
(b) In a prosecution under this section, it is not a defense that 
(1) the statement was inadmissible under the rules of evi­
dence; or 
(2) the oath or affirmation was taken or administered in an 
irregular manner. 
(c) Perjury is a class A felony. 
Sec. 11. 56. 210. UNSWORN FALSIFICATION. (a) A person commits the 
crime of unsworn falsification if, with the intent to mislead a public 
servant in the performance of his duty, he submits a false written or 
recorded statement which he does not believe to be true 
(1) in an application for a benefit; or 
(2) on a form bearing notice, authorized by law, that false 
statements made in it are punishable. 
(b) Unsworn falsification is a class A misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.56.220. PROOF OF GUILT. In a prosecution for perjury or 
unsworn falsification it is not necessary that proof be made by a 
particular number of witnesses or by documentary or other type of 
evidence. 
Sec. 11.56.230. PERJURY BY INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS. 
95. 
(a) A person 
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commits the crime of perjury by inconsistent statements when 
(1) in the course �f one or more official proceedings he make 
two or more statements under oath which are irreconcilably inconsistent 
to the degree that one of them is necessarily false; 
(2) he does not believe one of the statements to be true at 
the time the statement is made; and 
(3) each statement is made within the jurisdiction of this 
state and within the period of the statute of limitations for the 
crime charged. 
(b) In a prosecution under (a) of this section it is not necessary 
for the state to prove which statement was false but only that one or 
the other was false and not believed by the defendant to be true at the 
time he made the statement. Proof of the irreconcilable inconsistency 
of the statements is prima facie evidence that one or the other of the 
statements was false. 
(c) Perjury by inconsistent statements. is a class B felony. 
Sec. 11.56.240. DEFINITIONS. As used in secs. 200 - 230 of this 
chapter, unless the context requires otherwise, 
(1) "statement" means a representation of fact and includes 
a representation of opinion, belief or other state of mind where the 
representation clearly relates to state of mind apart from or in additio 
to any facts which are the subject of the representation; 
(2) "sworn statement" means 
(A) a statement knowingly given under oath or affirmatio 
attesting to the truth of what is stated, including a notarized 
statement; or 
(B) a statement knowingly given under penalty of perjury 
under AS 09.65.012. 
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ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 56 - OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
ARTICLE 2. PERJURY AND RELATED OFFENSES 
COMMENTARY 
The Effect of the Revised Code Provisions on the Existing 
Law of Perjury and Related Offenses 
In defining the crimes of Perjury, Unsworn Falsi­
fication and Perjury by Inconsistent Statements, the Perjury 
and Related Offenses Article: 
1. Replaces the numerous provisions scattered through­
out the Alaska statutes covering false statements 
in some applications for specific benefits with 
the single crime of Unsworn Falsification applicable 
to all applications for benefits. 
2. Eliminates the existing corroboration requirement 
for perjury. 
3. Recognizes that Perjury by Inconsistent Statements 
occurs when a defendant makes two statements under 
oath which are irreconcilable to a degree that one 
of them is necessarily false even though it may 
be impossible to prove which statement was false. 
SECTION ANALYSIS OF REVISED CODE 
I. TD AS 11.56.240 - DEFINITIONS 
''Statement" is defined in subsection (1) to mean 
any representation of fact, including a statement of opinion 
9 7 .  
or belief. Thus, the statement "I believe the car was red" 
is a false statement only if the defendant did not have the 
stated belief; its falsity does not depend on the actual 
color of the car. 
A " sworn statement" is defined in subsection (2) 
as a statement given under oath or affirmation including a 
notarized statement as well as a statement made "under penalty 
of perjury" pursuant to existing AS 09.65.012. 
II. TD AS 11.56.200 - PERJURY 
A. Existing Law 
Existing AS 11. 30.010 establishes the necessary 
elements of perjury as (1) taking a legally required or 
authorized oath or affirmation, and (2) wilful swearing or 
affirming falsely, (3) in regard to any material or immaterial 
matter. Nelson v. State, 546 P.2d 592, 594 (AK 1976) . 
Existing AS 11. 30.020 establishes three grades of 
punishment for perjury and subornation of perjury and in 
doing so provides that the minimum penalty for perjury 
committed in a criminal proceeding for a crime punishable by 
life imprisonment is less than the minimum penalty for perjury 
committed in all other judicial proceedings. 
The crime of Endeavor to Procure Perjury is found 
in existing AS 11.30.030. This statute will be replaced by 
the general solicitation statute in Chapter 31  of the Revised 
Code. 
B. The Code Provision 
Perjury under the Revised Code requires proof 
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of a false sworn statement which the person does not believe 
to be true. Consistent with existing law, it is not required 
that the statement be material to the proceeding. 
Subsection (b) (1) recognizes that it is no defense 
to perjury that the testimony was subject to objection 
and should not have been received while subsection (b) (2) 
codifies the generally accepted rule that irregularity in 
the administration of the oath is not a defense. (See 3 
Wharton on Criminal Law 1297). 
In the Revised Code, perjury is classified as a 
Class A felony, the most serious category of offense, with 
the exception of murder. This classification is consistent 
with existing law which recognizes that most forms of 
perjury carry a 10-year maximum penalty. AS ll.30.020 (b). 
In classifying perjury as a Class A felony, the 
Subcommission concluded that under certain circumstances 
perjury can be one of the most serious crimes contained in 
the Revised Code. A person who makes a false sworn state­
ment which sends an innocent man to jail, or which unjustly 
deprives a person of his life savings, should be punished 
severely. 
III. TD AS 11.56.210 - UNSWORN FALSIFICATION 
A. Existing Law 
There is no general provision in the existing 
Criminal Code which criminalizes unsworn falsification. 
Instead, there is presently scattered throughout the Alaska 
statutes an abundance of provisions dealing with false 
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statements in specific statutes without any consistency as 
to penalty. For example, a false statement in an application 
for unemployment compensation is punishable by a maximum 
$200 fine and/or 60 days in jail, AS 23.20.485, while a 
false statement in a claim under the workmen's compensation 
law is punishable by a maximum $1000 fine and/or one year 
in jail, AS 23.30.250. 
B. The Code Provision 
The purpose of TD AS 11.56.210 is to eliminate the 
numerous provisions outside Title 11 covering unsworn falsi­
fication and to replace them with one statute applicable to 
all unsworn falsifications. As the title indicates, the 
crime of Unsworn Falsification does not require that the false 
statement be made under oath. 
The proposed section offers a major advantage over 
existing law, in that it fills potential loopholes that 
result when the Legislature authorizes a form of economic 
grant or special license, but fails to enact a companion 
provision punishing falsification of the written or recorded 
application for such benefits. 
The essential elements of unsworn falsification 
under subsection (a) (1) are: (1) an intent to mislead a 
public servant in the performance of his duty, (2) an appli­
cation for any "benefit'' (defined in Chapter 6) , containing 
(3) a false written or recorded statement (4) which the 
person does not believe to be true. 
Unsworn falsification may also be committed pursuant 
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to subsection (a) (2) by making a false statement on a form 
which bears notice that false statements made therein are 
criminal. The Commentary to § 20.060 of the Proposed Missouri 
Criminal Code discusses the value of subsection (a) (2) 
[This section] ... picks up a common modern 
device by which the government indicates the 
special gravity which it attaches to truth in 
a particular document. It is especially use-
ful as an alternative to prescribing oaths before 
notaries, avoiding inconvenience and expense . . .  
The specification that this device can be used 
only by legislative authority is intended to make 
sure that it is not overused, merely on the whim 
of officials, with consequent depreciation of 
its value. 
IV. RETRACTION 
The Subcommission considered several provisions 
establishing timely retraction as a defense to perjury 
but after much debate concluded that the defense should 
not be recognized. 
The Subcommission agreed with the approach taken 
by the U.S. Supreme Court: 
The argument [in favor of the retraction 
defense] overlooks the tendency of such a view 
to encourage false swearing in the belief that 
if the falsity be not discovered before the end 
of the hearing it will have its intended effect, 
but, if discovered, the witness may purge himself 
of crime by resuming his role as witness and 
substituting the truth for his previous false­
hood. It ignores the fact that the oath 
,_,drninistered to the witness calls on him freely 
to disclose the truth in the first instance and 
not to put the court and the parties to the 
disadvantage, hindrance, and delay of ultimately 
extracting the truth by cross-examination, 
extraneous investigation or other collateral means. 
U. S. v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 574 (1937). 
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While the Subcommission rejected retraction as 
an absolute defense, it did recognize that a person's re­
traction of his false statement should be relevant to the 
prosecutor's decision to charge as well as to the judge's 
imposition of sentence upon conviction. 
V. TD AS 11.56.220 - PROOF OF GUILT 
While there is currently no statute mandating 
that a perjury prosecution be subjected to special rules 
of proof, the Alaska Supreme Court has held that a perjury 
prosecution cannot be based on the uncorroborated testimony 
of a single witness. Nelson v. State, supra, at 595. 
In the Revised Code, perjury and unsworn falsi­
fication, like any other crimes, must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. There is no requirement that any special 
number of witnesses appear against the defendant, or that 
the testimony of one witness must be corroborated. 
The main argument in favor of retaining the cor­
roboration rule is that testimonial evidence is inherently 
so unreliable and the crime of perjury so peculiarly subject 
to testimonial evidence at cross-purposes that something 
more than testimony of a single witness should be required. 
If two witnesses, for instance, attempt to frame an innocent 
defendant for perjury, contradictions between testimony will 
appear. 
The argument that two witnesses are required so that 
false accusations can be discovered has been rejected by the 
Alaska Supreme Court in permitting conviction on the testimony 
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of one witness plus corroborating evidence. Risher v. State, 
418 P.2d 983, 985 (AK 1966). The existing requirement that the 
testimony of a single witness must be corroborated conflicts 
with the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. If a 
single witness is believed, and the elements of perjury are 
proved, the traditional standard of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt seems sufficient to protect an innocent defendant. 
The corroboration requirement undoubtedly makes 
perjury convictions more difficult to obtain. It has been 
argued that a less stringent rule may create a greater likeli­
hood of false accusations of perjury, while the more exacting 
rule still adequately protects the interests of society. A 
similar argument was considered and rejected by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in State v. Storey, 182 NW 613, 615 (Minn. 1921). 
We find ourselves unable to approve the 
doctrine that perjury is a more heinous crime 
than murder, or that one charged with perjury 
should have greater immunity than one charged 
with murder .... With what consistency can it 
be said that a quality of testimony which will 
justify a court in condemning a defendant to 
life imprisonment, or, in some jurisdictions, 
to be hanged, is insufficient to sustain a 
conviction of the falsifier of the crime of 
perjury .... 
Perjury and unsworn falsification are no exceptions 
to the rule that guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The number of witnesses as well as the corroborating 
evidence in support of the witnesses becomes simply one of 
several factors that a jury may take into consideration 
in arriving at a verdict. 
103. 
VI. TD AS 11. 56.230 - PERJURY BY INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS 
Under existing law and in the Revised Code, the 
crime of perjury requires that the defendant make a false 
statement. Consequently, substantial problems may arise when 
a defendant has made two statements under oath that are irrecon­
cilably inconsistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily 
false, but the prosecution is unable to prove which statement 
was false. 
As an example, consider the situation where Jones 
testifies at a preliminary hearing that Brown came to his 
office and attempted to extort money from him. At the 
subsequent trial, Jones testifies that he has never met 
Brown, that Brown never came to his office and that no one 
ever attempted to extort money from him. If there is no 
other way to prove whether Brown came to Jones' office to 
extort money, other than by the testimony of Jones, the 
state may not be able to convict Jones of perjury even 
though Jones' two statements are ireconcilable to the 
degree that one of them is necessarily false. 
While there is no existing Alaska statute providing 
for the crime of perjury by inconsistent statements, the 
offense is equated with perjury in some revised codes and 
has been read into the existing perjury statute in other 
states. See, Arizona Rev. Stat. § 13.562; N.Y. Penal Law 
§210. 20; Ill. Crim. Code §32-2(b) and Oglesby v. State, 
337 So.2d 381 (Ala. 1976). 
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In TD AS 11.56.230 the Revised Code recognizes 
the separate offense of Perjury by Inconsistent Statements. 
The section is a compromise between the common law position 
that the prosecution is required to prove which of two sworn 
contradictory statements was false and the existing law in 
some jurisdictions which provides that swearing to the truth 
of two inconsistent sworn statements is perjury. 
Under this statute, the prosecution cannot simply 
rely on the introduction of the two irreconcilable statements; 
it must also be shown that the defendant did not believe 
one of the statements to be true at the time the statement 
was made. 
This section is restricted to inconsistent state­
ments (1) both having been made within the period of the 
statute limitations, and (2) within Alaska. 
The first limitation is designed to prevent a 
person from being indirectly punished for an old offense. 
The purpose of the second restriction is based on the rule 
that Alaska courts can punish only crimes committed in Alaska. 
The problems that otherwise arise can best be shown by the 
following hypothetical situation: assume that Jones testified 
as a witness in a trial in Oregon, then subsequently appeared 
before an Alaska court and testified in a manner inconsistent 
with his Oregon testimony. If the Alaska testimony was false, 
Jones committed perjury in Alaska, but if the Alaska testimony 
was true, no crime was committed in Alaska. Without the second 
limitation, if it were shown that the Oregon statement was false, 
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Jones would stand convicted in Alaska for having committed 
a crime in Oregon and for having testified truthfully in 
Alaska. Subsection (a) (1) avoids this result by requiring 
that both inconsistent statements be made in Alaska. Thus, 
it becomes unimportant to determine which one was true and 
which was false; one of them was false, and since it was made 
in Alaska the crime was committed in this state. 
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APPENDIX I 
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
Chapters 11, 16, 21, 31, 41 (Article 5), and 56 (Articles 1 and 2) 
DERIVATIONS 
CHAPTER 11 - GENERAL PROVISIONS OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
TD AS 11.11.100 - General Requirements of Culpability 
Subsection (a) is derived directly from ORS 
161.095(1). 
Subsection (b) is based on ORS 161.095(2). 
Subsection (b) (1) (A) is based on ORS 16l.105(a). 
Subsection (b) (1) (B) is based on N.Y. Penal Law 
§ 15.15(2). 
Subsection (b) (2) is based on ORS 161. 105(b) and 
Proposed Arizona Revised Criminal Code § 203(b). 
TD AS 11.11.110 - Construction of Statutes With 
Respect to Culpability 
Subsection (a) is based on N.Y. Penal Law § 15.15(1). 
Subsections (b) and (c) are based on Proposed 
Arizona Revised Criminal Code § 203(b) and (c). 
TD AS 11.11.120 - Effect of Ignorance or Mistake 
on Liability 
Subsection (a) is derived directly from ORS 161.115(4). 
Subsection (b) is based on N.Y. Penal Law § 15.20(1). 
TD AS 11.11.130 - Intoxication or Drug Use as 
Defense 
This section is based on ORS 161.125. 
TD AS 11.11.140 - Definitions 
Subsection (a) (1) is based on N.Y. Penal Law § 15.05(1). 
Subsection (a) (2) is based on N.Y. Penal Law § 15.05(2). 
and Illinois Annotated Statutes Chapter 38 § 4-5. 
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Subsection (a) (3) is based on N.Y. Penal Law 
§ 15.05 (3). 
Subsection (a) (4) is based on N.y. Penal Law 
§ 15.05 (4). 
Subsection (b) is derived directly from N.Y. 
Penal Law § 15.00. 
CHAPTER 16 - PARTIES TO CRIME 
161.165. 
TD AS 11.16.100 - Liability Based on Conduct 
This section is based on ORS 161.150. 
TD AS 11.16.110 - Liability Based Upon the Conduct 
of Another: Complicity 
This section is based on ORS 161.155. 
TD AS 11.16.120 - Exemptions to Criminal Liability 
for Conduct of Another 
Subsections (a) (1) and (a) (2) are based on ORS 
Subsection (a) (3) is based on N.Y. Penal Law 
§40.10 (1). 
Subsection (b) is based on ORS 161.160 and N.Y. 
Penal Law § 20.05 (1). 
Subsection (c) is derived directly from N.Y. 
Penal Law § 40.10 (5). 
TD AS 11.16.130 - Criminal Liability of Organizations 
This section is based on Revised Arkansas Criminal 
Code §§ 41-401 and 41-402. 
TD AS 11. 16.140 - Criminal Liability of an Individual 
for Organization Conduct 
This section is based on ORS 161.175. 
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CHAPTER 21 - JUSTIFICATION 
TD AS 11. 21.100 - Justification: Burden of 
Injecting the Issue 
This section is based on Proposed Missouri Criminal 
Code § 8. 050(4). 
TD AS 11. 21. 120 - Justification: Necessity 
This section is based on Proposed New Jersey 
Criminal Code § 
TD AS 11. 21.130 - Justification: Use of Physical 
Force in Defense of Self 
This section is based on N. Y. Penal Law § 35.15. 
TD AS 11.21.140 - Justification: Use of Physical 
Force in Defense of a Third Person 
This section is based on Proposed Arizona Revised 
Criminal Code § 406(1). 
TD AS 11. 21. 150 - Justification: Use of Physical 
Force in Defense of Premises 
This section is based on N.Y. Penal Law § 35.20. 
TD AS 11.21. 160 - Justification: Use of Physical 
Force in Defense of Property 
This section is based on N. Y. Penal Law § 35.25. 
TD AS 11. 21. 170 - Justification: Use of Physical 
Force by Peace Officer in Making an Arrest or 
Preventing an Escape 
This section is based on N. Y. Penal Law § 35. 30(1) 
and Proposed Missouri Criminal Code § 8.080. 
TD AS 11.21. 180 - Justification: Use of Physical 
Force by Private Person Assisting an Arrest or 
Preventing Escape 
This section is based on N.Y. Penal Law § 35. 30(3). 
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TD AS 11.21.190 - Justification: Use of Physical 
Force by Private Person in Making Arrest or 
Preventing Escape 
This section is based on N. Y. Penal Law § 35.30(4). 
TD AS 11. 21.200 - Justification: Use of Physical 
Force in Resisting Arrest 
This section is based on ORS 161. 260. 
TD AS 11. 21.210 - Justification: Use of Physical 
Force to Prevent Escape from Correctional Facility 
This section is based on ORS 161. 265. 
CHAPTER 31 - ATTEMPT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
TD AS 11. 31. 100 - Attempt 
This section is based on N. Y. Penal Law §§ 110. 00-10 
and N.Y. Penal Law § 40. 10(3) and (5). 
TD AS 11. 31.110 - Solicitation 
This section is based on ORS 161.435-440. 
CHAPTER 41 - OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 
ARTICLE 5 - ROBBERY 
TD AS 11.41. 500 - Robbery in the First Degree 
This section is based on ORS 164.415. 
TD AS 11. 41. 510 - Robbery in the Second Degree 
This section is based on ORS 164.395. 
CHAPTER 56 - OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
ARTICLE 1 - BRIBERY AND RELATED OFFENSES 
TD AS 11. 56.100 - Bribery 
This section is based on ORS 162.015 and 162. 035, 
but uses "benefit" instead of "pecuniary benefit". 
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TD AS 11.56.110 - Receiving a Bribe 
This section is based on ORS 162.025; but uses 
"benefit" instead of "pecuniary benefit". 
TD AS 11.56.120 - Receiving Unlawful Gratuities 
This section is based on N.Y. Penal Law § 200.35. 
ARTICLE 2 - PERJURY 
TD AS 11.56.200 - Perjury 
This section is based on N.Y. Penal Law § 210.05. 
TD AS 11.56.210 - Unsworn Falsification 
This section is based on Proposed Missouri 
Criminal Code § 20. 060(1) (a). 
TD AS 11.56.220 - Proof of Guilt 
This section is based on Proposed Arizona Revised 
Criminal Code § 2706. 
TD AS 11.56.230 - Perjury by Inconsistent 
Statements 
This section is based on N.Y. Penal Law § 210.20 
and Proposed Arizona Revised Criminal Code § 2704. 
TD AS 11.56.2 40 - Definitions 
This section is based on ORS 162.055 (3) and (4). 
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APPENDIX II 
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
EXISTING LAW 
CHAPTER 16. PARTIES TO A CRIME 
Sec. 11.10.010. PARTIES TO CRIME CLASSIFIED. 
The parties to crime are 
(1) principals; 
(2) accessories. 
Sec. 11.10.050. PUNISHMENT OF ACCESSORIES. Except 
in cases where a different punishment is prescribed 
by law, an accessory to a felony, upon conviction, 
is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary 
for not less than one year nor more than five years, 
or by imprisonment in a jail for not less than three 
months nor more than one year, or by a fine of not 
less than $100 nor more than $500. 
Sec. 12.15.010. ABROGATION OF DISTINCTIONS 
BETWEEN ACCESSORIES AND PRINCIPALS. The distinction 
between an accessory before the fact and a principal, 
and between principals in the first and second degree 
is abrogated; and all persons concerned in the 
commission of a crime, whether they directly commit 
the act constituting the crime or, though not present, 
aid and abet in its commission, shall be prosecuted, 
tried, and punished as principals. 
Sec. 12.15.020. ACCESSORIES AFTER THE FACT. All 
persons who, after the commission of any felony, conceal 
or aid the offender with knowledge that he has committed 
a felony and with intent that he may avoid or escape 
from arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment are 
accessories. There are no accessories in misdemeanors. 
Sec. 12.15.030. PROSECUTION OF ACCESSORY AFTER 
THE FACT. An accessory after the fact to the commission 
of a felony may be prosecuted, tried, and punished, 
though the principal felon is neither prosecuted nor 
tried. 
112. 
CHAPTER 21 - JUSTIFICATION 
Sec. ll.15.J90. JUS�IFIA3LE HO�ICIDE BY PUBLIC 
OFFICER OR AGENT. The killing of a human being is 
justifiable when committed by a public officer or a 
person acting in the aid and assistance and by the 
command of a public officer 
(1) in obedience to the judgment of a competent 
court; 
(2) when necessarily committed in overcoming 
resistance to the execution of legal process or to 
the discharge of a legal duty; 
(3) when necessarily committed in retaking persons 
charged with or convicted of crime who have escaped 
or been rescued; or 
(4) when necessarily committed in arresting a 
person fleeinq from justice who has committed a felony. 
Sec. 11.15.100. JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE. The 
killing of a human being is justifiable when committed 
by any person 
(1) to prevent the commission of a felony upon 
him, or upon his husband, wife, parent, child, master, 
mistress, or servant; 
(2) to prevent the commission of a felony upon 
his property, or upon property in his possession, or 
upon or in a dwelling house where he may be; 
(3) in the attempt, by lawful means, to arrest 
a person who has colllJ'i.litted a felony, or in the lawful 
attempt to suppress a riot or preserve the peace. 
Sec. 11.15.110. EXCUSABLE HOMICIDE. The killing 
of a human being is excusable when committed 
(1) by accident or misfortune in lawfully correcting 
a child, or in doing any other lawful act, by lawful 
means, with usual and ordinary caution and without 
unlawful intent; or 
(2) by accident or misfortune in the heat of 
passion, upon a sudden and sufficient provocation, 
or upon a sudden combat, without premeditation or 
undue advantage being taken, and without a dangerous 
weapon or thing b�ing used, and not done in a cruel 
or unusual manner. 
Sec. 12.25.010. PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ARREST. 
An a�rent may be made by a peace officer or by a 
private person. 
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Sec. 12. 25. 030. GROUNDS FOR ARREST BY PRIVATE 
PERSON OR PEACE OFFICER WITHOUT WARRANT. A private 
person or a peace officer without a warrant may arrest 
a person 
(1) for a crime committed or attempted in his 
presence; 
(2) when the person has committed a felony, 
although not in his presence; 
(3) when a felony has in fact been committed, 
and he has reasonable cause for believing the person 
to have committed it. 
Sec. 12. 25.060. METHOD OF ARREST BY OFFICER 
WITHOUT WARRANT. When making an arrest without a 
warrant, the peace officer shall inform the person 
to be arrested of his authority and the cause of the 
arrest, unless the person to be arrested is then 
engaged in the commission of a crime, or is pursued 
immediately after its commission or after an escape. 
Sec. 12. 25. 07 0. LIMITATION ON RESTRAI�JT IN PaREST. 
No peace officer or private person may subject a person 
arrested to greater restraint than is necessary and 
proper for his arrest and detention. 
Sec. 12. 25.080. MEANS TO EFFECT RESISTED ARREST. 
If the person being arrested either flees or forcibly 
resists after notice of intention to make the arrest, 
the peace officer may use all the necessary and 
proper means to effect the arrest. 
Sec. 12.25.090. AUTHORITY TO SUMMON AID TO MAKE 
ARREST. A peace officer making an arrest may orally 
summon as many persons as he considers necessary to 
aid him in making the arrest. A person when required 
by an officer shall aid him in making the arrest. 
Sec. 12.25. 120. RETAKING ESCAPED PRISONER. If 
a person arrested escapes or is rescued, the person 
from whose custody he escaped or was rescued may 
immediately pursue and retake him at any time and in 
any place in the state. 
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Sec. 12.25.130. MEANS USABLE TO RETAKE PRISONER. 
To retake the person escaping or rescued, the person 
pursuing may use the same means and do any act 
necessary and proper in making an original arrest. 
Sec. 12.60.010. RESISTANCE TO COM..�ISSION OF 
CRIME. Lawful resistance to the commission of crime 
may be made by the party about to be injured, or by 
another person in aid or defense of the person about 
to be injured to prevent 
(1) a crime against his person or his family; 
(2) an illegal attempt by force to take 0r injure 
property in his possession. 
CHAPTER 31. ATTEMPT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
Sec. 11.05. 020. PUNISHMENT FOR ATTEMPT. A person 
who attempts to commit a crime, and in the attempt does 
any act toward the commission of the crime, but fails, 
or is prevented or intercepted in the perpetration of 
the crime, when no other provision is made by law for 
the punishment of the attempt, upon conviction, is 
punishable as follows. 
(1) If the crime attempted is punishable by impri­
sonment in the penitentiary or state jail, the punishment 
for the attempt is by the same imprisonment, as the 
case may be, for a term not more than half the longest 
period prescribed as a punishment for the crime. If 
the period prescribed as a punishment for the crime 
is an indeterminate or life term, the punishment for 
the attempt shall be fixed by the court at a term not 
more than 10 years. 
(2) If the crime attempted is punishable by a 
fine, the punishment for the attempt shall be by a 
fine of not more than half the amount of the largest 
fine prescribed as a punishment for the crime. 
Sec. 11. 10.070. INCITING COMMISSION OF CRIME. A 
person who wilfully and knowingly solicits, incites or 
induces another to commit a felony or a misdemeanor 
in the state, 
(1) if the act solicited, incited or induced is 
a felony, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction 
is punishable by a fine of not more than $3000, or by 
imprisonment for not more than three years, or by both; 
(2) if the act solicited, incited or induced is 
a misdemeanor, is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon 
conviction is punishable by a fine of not more than 
$500, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, 
or by both. 
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CHAPTER 41. ARTICLE 5 - ROBBERY 
Sec. 11. 15. 160. ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO KILL OR 
COMMIT RAPE OR ROBBERY. A person who assaults another 
with intent to kill, or to commit rape or robbery 
upon the person assaulted, is punishable by imprison­
ment in the penitentiary for not more than 15 years 
nor less than one year. 
Sec. 11.15. 240. ROBBERY. A person who, by 
force or violence, or by putting in fear, steals 
and takes anything of value from the person of 
another is guilty of robbery, and is punishable 
by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more 
than 15 years nor less than one year. 
Sec. 11. 15. 295. USE OF FIREARMS DURING THE 
COMMISSION OF CERTAIN CRIMES. A person who uses or 
carries a firearm during the commission of a robbery, 
assault, murder, rape, burglary, or kidnapping is 
guilty of a felony and upon conviction for a first 
offense is punishable by imprisonment for not less 
than 10 years. Upon conviction for a second or 
subsequent offense in violation of this section, the 
offender shall be imprisoned for not less than 25 
years. 
CHAPTER 56. ARTICLE 1 - BRIBERY 
Sec. 11. 30. 040. BRIBERY. A person who corruptly 
gives, offers, or promises to give a gift, gratuity, 
valuable consideration or other thing, or corruptly 
promises to do or causes to be done an act beneficial 
to a peace officer, judicial officer, executive officer 
or public official, with intent to influence the vote, 
opinion, decision, judgment, or official conduct of 
the officer or official in a matter, question, duty, 
cause, or proceeding which is or by law may come 
or be brought before him, or with intent to influence 
the person to act in his official capacity in a 
particular manner to produce or prevent a particular 
result, upon conviction, is punishable by imprisonment 
for not less than two years nor more than 10 years. 
Sec. 11. 30. 050. ACCEPTING A BRIBE. A peace 
officer, judicial officer, executive officer or public 
official who corruptly accepts or receives a gift, 
gratuity, valuable consideration, or thing, or a promise 
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of one of them, or a promise to do or cause to be done 
an act beneficial to him, with the understanding or 
agreement, express or implied, that the officer or 
official will give his vote, opinion, decision, or 
judgment in a particular manner in a matter, question, 
duty, cause, or proceeding which then is or may by law 
come or be brought before him, or with the understanding 
or agreement that the person will in his official 
capacity act in a particular manner to produce or 
prevent a particular result, upon conviction, is 
punishable by imprisonment for not less than five 
years nor more than 15 years. 
Sec. 11.30.230. RECEIVING UNAUTHORIZED FEES; 
NONFEASANCE IN OFFICE. An officer of the state, 
borough, city, or other municipal or public corporation, 
other than the governor or judge of the superior 
court, who (1) wilfully and knowingly charges, takes, 
or receives a fee or compensation, other than that 
authorized or permitted by law, for an official service 
or duty performed by him; 
CHAPTER 56. ARTICLE 2 - PERJURY 
Sec. 11.30.010. PERJURY AND SUBORNATION OF 
PERJURY. (a) A person authorized by law to take 
an oath or affirmation, or a person whose oath or 
affirmation is required by law, who wilfully and 
falsely swears or affirms in regard to a matter 
concerning which an oath or affirmation is authorized 
or required, is guilty of perjury. 
(b) A person who procures another to commit 
the crime of perjury is guilty of subornation of 
perjury. 
Sec. 11.30.020. PUNISHMENT FOR PERJURY OR 
SUBORNATION OF PERJURY. (a) A person convicted of 
perjury committed in a criminal action or proceeding 
for a crime punishable by imprisonment for life is 
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for 
not less than two years nor more than 20 years. 
(b) A person convicted of perjury committed in 
a proceeding in a court other than a criminal action 
referred to in (a) of this section is punishable 
by imprisonment in a penitentiary for not less than 
three years nor more than 10 years. 
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(c) A person convicted of perjury committed 
otherwise than in a proceeding before a court of 
justice, or a person convicted of the crime of 
subornation of perjury, however committed, is 
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for 
not less than one year nor more than five years. 
Sec. 11.30.030. ENDEAVOR TO PROCURE PERJURY. 
A person who endeavors to procure or incite another 
to commit the crime of perjury, though no perjury 
is committed, upon conviction, is punishable by 
imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than 
one year nor more than three years. 
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